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The core theory used in economics builds on a simple but powerful model 
of behavior. Individuals make choices 
so as to  maximize a utility function, 
using the information available, and pro-
cessing this information appropriately. 
Individuals’ preferences are assumed to 
be time-consistent, affected only by own 
payoffs, and independent of the framing of 
the decision.
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The research in Psychology and Economics (a.k.a. Behavioral Economics) suggests that 
individuals deviate from the standard model in three respects: (1) nonstandard prefer-
ences, (2) nonstandard beliefs, and (3) nonstandard decision making. In this paper, I 
survey the empirical evidence from the field on these three classes of deviations. The 
evidence covers a number of applications, from consumption to finance, from crime to 
voting, from charitable giving to labor supply. In the class of nonstandard preferences, 
I discuss time preferences (self-control problems), risk preferences (reference depen-
dence), and social preferences. On nonstandard beliefs, I present evidence on overcon-
fidence, on the law of small numbers, and on projection bias. Regarding nonstandard 
decision making, I cover framing, limited attention, menu effects, persuasion and 
social pressure, and emotions. I also present evidence on how rational actors—firms, 
employers, CEOs, investors, and politicians—respond to the nonstandard behavior 
described in the survey. Finally, I briefly discuss under what conditions experience 
and market interactions limit the impact of the nonstandard features.
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Laboratory experiments in both the psy-
chology and the economics literature raise 
serious questions about these assumptions, 
though. In the laboratory, individuals are 
time-inconsistent (Richard H. Thaler 1981), 
show a concern for the welfare of others (Gary 
Charness and Matthew Rabin 2002; Ernst 
Fehr and Simon Gächter 2000), and exhibit 
an attitude toward risk that depends on fram-
ing and reference points (Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky 1979). They violate ratio-
nal expectations, for example, by overesti-
mating their own skills (Colin Camerer and 
Dan Lovallo 1999) and overprojecting from 
the current state (Daniel Read and Barbara 
van Leeuwen 1998). They use heuristics to 
solve complex problems (Xavier Gabaix et al. 
2006) and are affected by transient emotions 
in their decisions (George Loewenstein and 
Jennifer S. Lerner 2003).
Unclear from these experiments, though, 
is how much these deviations from the stan-
dard theory in the laboratory affect eco-
nomic decisions in the field. In markets, 
people hone their behavioral rules to match 
the incentives they face and sort into favor-
able economic settings (Steven D. Levitt 
and John A. List 2007). This is likely to limit 
the impact of deviations from the standard 
model in markets. However, other forces are 
likely to increase the impact. Firms often 
have incentives to accentuate the deviations 
of consumers to profit from them (Stefano 
DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier 2004). 
In addition, important economic decisions 
such as the choice of retirement savings or a 
house purchase are taken seldom, with lim-
ited scope for feedback and sorting.
The objective of this paper is to sum-
marize a growing list of recent papers that 
document aspects of behavior in market 
settings that also deviate from the forecasts 
of the standard theory. This research area 
is known as Psychology and Economics (or 
Behavioral Economics). The evidence sug-
gests deviations from the standard theory 
in each step of the decision-making pro-
cess: (1) nonstandard preferences, (2) incor-
rect beliefs, and (3) systematic biases in 
decision making. For each of these three 
steps, I present an example of the labora-
tory evidence, introduce a simple model if 
available, and summarize the strength and 
weaknesses of the field evidence. Since the 
focus of the paper is on the field evidence, I 
do not survey the laboratory evidence or the 
theoretical literature.
To fix ideas, consider the following styl-
ized version of the standard model, modi-
fied from Rabin (2002b). Individual i at time 
t = 0 maximizes expected utility subject to 
a probability distribution p(s) of the states of 
the world s ∈ S:
(1)  max  
 x i 
t ∈Xi
  ∑ 
t=0
∞
 δt   ∑ 
 s t ∈ S t 
 
 
 p( s t ) U( x i 
t | st).
The utility function U (x | s) is defined over 
the payoff  x i 
t of player i and future utility is 
discounted with a (time-consistent) discount 
factor δ.
The first class of deviations from the stan-
dard model in equation (1) is nonstandard 
preferences, discussed in section 2. I focus 
on three dimensions: time preferences, risk 
preferences, and social preferences. With 
respect to time preferences, the findings on 
self-control problems, for example in retire-
ment savings, challenge the assumption that 
the discount factor, δ, is time-consistent. With 
respect to risk preferences, the evidence, for 
example in insurance decisions, suggests that 
the utility function U (xi | s) depends on a ref-
erence point r: the utility function becomes 
U (xi | r, s). With respect to social prefer-
ences, the evidence, for example on chari-
table giving, suggests that the utility function 
depends also on the payoff of other people 
x−i : the utility is U (xi, x−i | s). The research on 
nonstandard preferences constitutes the bulk 
of the empirical research in Psychology and 
Economics.
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The second class of deviations from the 
standard model in equation (1) is nonstan-
dard beliefs  ˜      p(s) ≠ p(s), reviewed in section 3. 
Systematic overconfidence about own abil-
ity can help explain managerial behavior of 
CEOs. Non-Bayesian forecasting rationalizes 
“gambler’s fallacy” behavior in lotteries and 
overinference from past stock returns. The 
overprojection of current tastes on future 
tastes can explain aspects of the purchase of 
seasonal items.
The third class of deviations from the stan-
dard model is nonstandard decision mak-
ing, discussed in section 4. For given utility 
U (x | s) and beliefs p(s), individuals resort to 
heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) 
instead of solving the complex maximiza-
tion problem (1). They are affected by the 
framing of a decision problem, for example 
in investment decisions. They simplify a 
complex decision by being inattentive to 
less salient features of a problem, from asset 
allocation to purchase decisions. They use 
suboptimal heuristics when choosing from a 
menu of options X i , such as for savings plans 
or loan terms. They are also subject to social 
pressure and persuasion, for example in their 
workplace performance and in voting deci-
sions. Finally, they are affected by emotions, 
as in the case of investment decisions.
While I organize the deviations in three 
separate classes, the three types of devia-
tions are often related. For example, persua-
sion leads to different decisions through the 
change in beliefs that it induces.
The first part of the paper provides evi-
dence that these deviations affect the behav-
ior of individual decisionmakers, such as 
consumers and small investors. But are these 
deviations large enough to matter for our the-
ories of how markets and institutions work? 
I provide evidence on how rational actors 
respond to these behavioral anomalies in sec-
tion 5. In particular, I discuss the response 
of firms, employers, managers, investors, 
and politicians. These agents appear to have 
changed their own behavior in ways that 
would be puzzling given the standard theory 
but that are consistent with utility-maximiz-
ing responses to the documented behavioral 
anomalies. This provides indirect support for 
the lab and field evidence of the anomalies.
Given this evidence, I expect that the doc-
umented deviations from the standard model 
will be increasingly incorporated in eco-
nomic models. Indeed, features such as time 
inconsistency and reference dependence 
have become common assumptions. In the 
concluding section, I present remarks on why 
these deviations matter also in the field and 
also discuss directions for future research in 
Psychology and Economics.
This overview differs from other sur-
veys of Psychology and Economics (Rabin 
1998; Rabin 2002b; Sendhil Mullainathan 
and Thaler 2001; Camerer 2006) because 
it focuses on empirical research using non-
laboratory data. A number of caveats are 
in order. First, this paper does not provide 
an overview by field of application since it 
is organized instead by psychological prin-
ciples; the interested reader can consult as 
a starting point the book chapters in Peter 
Diamond and Hannu Vartiainen (2007). 
Second, the emphasis of the paper is on (rel-
atively) detailed summaries of a small num-
ber of papers for each deviation. As such, the 
survey provides a selective coverage of the 
field evidence, although it strives to cover all 
the important deviations.1 Finally, this over-
view undersamples studies in Marketing and 
provides a partial coverage of the research 
in Behavioral Finance, probably the most 
developed application of Psychology and 
Economics, for which a comprehensive sur-
vey of the empirical findings is available 
(Nicholas Barberis and Thaler 2003).
1 This overview does not discuss deviations from the 
standard model that are widely documented in experi-
ments but not in the field, such as will-power exhaustion 
and the availability heuristics.
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2. Nonstandard Preferences
2.1 Self-Control Problems
The standard model (1) assumes a discount 
factor δ between any two time periods that is 
independent of when the utility is evaluated. 
This assumption implies time consistency, 
that is, the decisionmaker has the same pref-
erences about future plans at different points 
in time.2
2.1.1 Laboratory Experiments 
Experiments on intertemporal choice, sum-
marized in Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec 
(1992) and Shane Frederick, Loewenstein, 
and Ted O’Donoghue (2002), have cast doubt 
on this assumption. This evidence suggests 
that discounting is steeper in the immedi-
ate future than in the further future. For 
example, the median subject in Thaler (1981) 
is indifferent between $15 now and $20 in 
one month (for an annual discount rate of 
345 percent) and between $15 now and $100 
in ten years (for an annual discount rate of 
19 percent).3 The preference for immediate 
gratification captured in these studies appears 
to have identifiable neural underpinnings. 
Intertemporal decisions involving payoffs in 
the present activate different neural systems 
than decisions involving only payoffs in future 
periods (Samuel M. McClure et al. 2004).
Intertemporal preferences with these fea-
tures capture self-control problems. When 
evaluating outcomes in the distant future, 
individuals are patient and make plans to 
exercise, stop smoking, and look for a better 
2 Strictly speaking, the standard model merely assumes 
time consistency, not a constant discount factor δ. Still, 
most of the evidence in this section—the adoption of 
costly commitments or behavior that differs from the 
plans—directly violates time consistency and hence also 
this more general version of the standard model.
3 The laboratory experiments on time preferences face 
at least three issues: (1) most experiments are over hypo-
thetical choices, including Thaler (1981); (2) in the experi-
ments with real payments, issues of credibility regarding
job. As the future gets near, the discounting 
gets steep, and the individuals engage in binge 
eating, light another (last) cigarette,  and stay 
put on their job. Preferences with  these fea-
tures therefore induce time inconsistency.
2.1.2 Model 
David Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue 
and Rabin (1999a) formalized these prefer-
ences using (β, δ) preferences,4 building on 
R. H. Strotz (1956), E. S. Phelps and R. A. 
Pollak (1968), and George A. Akerlof (1991). 
Labeling as ut the per-period utility, the 
overall utility at time t, Ut , is
 Ut = ut + βδut+1 + βδ2ut+2 + βδ3ut+3 + …
The only difference from the standard 
model (with δ as the discount factor) is the 
parameter β ≤ 1, capturing the self-control 
problems. For β < 1, the discounting between 
the present and the future is higher than 
between any future time periods, captur-
ing the main finding of the experiments. For 
β = 1, this reduces to the standard model.
A second key element in this model 
is the modeling of expectations about 
future time preferences. O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (2001) allow the agent to be par-
tially naive (that is, overconfident) about 
the future self-control problems. A par-
tially naive (β, δ) agent expects in the future 
period t + s to have the utility function
  ˆ 
   
 Ut+s = ut+s +  ˆ      βδut+s+1 +  ˆ      βδ2ut+s+2 
 +  ˆ      βδ3ut+s+3 + …,
4 These preferences are also labeled quasi-hyperbolic 
preferences, to distinguish them from (pure) hyperbolic 
preferences, and present-biased preferences.
the future payments can induce seeming present bias; and 
(3) the discounting should apply to consumption units, 
rather than to money (in theory, over monetary outcomes, 
only the interest rate should matter). While none of the 
experiments fully addresses all three issues, the consis-
tency of the evidence suggests that the phenomenon is 
genuine.
319DellaVigna: Psychology and Economics
with  ˆ  
   
 β ≥ β. The agent may be sophisticated 
about the self-control problem ( ˆ  
   
 β = β), fully 
naive ( ˆ  
   
 β = 1), or somewhere in between. This 
model, therefore, combines self-control prob-
lems with a form of overconfidence, naiveté 
about future self-control.
Other models have been proposed to cap-
ture self-control problems, including axi-
omatic models that emphasize preferences 
over choice sets (Faruk Gul and Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer 2001) and models of the conflict 
between two systems, a planner and a doer 
(Thaler and Hersh M. Shefrin 1981 and Drew 
Fudenberg and David K. Levine 2006, among 
others). For lack of space, and since most 
applied work has referred to the (β, δ) model, I 
refer only to this latter model in what follows.
As an example of how the (β, δ) model 
operates, consider a good with immediate 
payoff (relative to a comparison activity) b1 
at t = 1 and delayed payoff b2 at t = 2. An 
investment good, like exercising or searching 
for a job, has the features b1 < 0 and b2 > 0: 
the good requires effort at present and deliv-
ers happiness tomorrow. Conversely, a leisure 
good, like consumption of tempting food or 
watching TV, has the features b1 > 0 and 
b2 < 0: it provides an immediate reward, at 
a future cost.
How often does the agent want to con-
sume, from an ex ante perspective? If the 
agent could set consumption one period 
in advance, at t = 0, she would consume if 
βδb1 + βδ2b2 ≥ 0, or 
(2) b1 + δb2 ≥ 0.
(Notice that β cancels out, since all payoffs 
are in the future)
How much does the agent actually con-
sume at t = 1? The agent consumes if 
(3) b1 + βδb2 ≥ 0.
Compared to the desired consumption, 
therefore, a (β, δ) agent consumes too little 
investment good (b2 > 0) and too much lei-
sure good (b2 < 0). This is the self-control 
problem in action. In response, a sophisti-
cated agent looks for commitment devices 
to increase the consumption of investment 
goods and to reduce the consumption of lei-
sure goods.
Finally, how much does the agent expect 
to consume? The agent expects to consume 
in the future if 
(4) b1 +  ˆ      βδb2 ≥ 0,
with  ˆ  
   
 β ≥ β. Compared to the actual con-
sumption in (3), the agent overestimates the 
consumption of the investment good (b2 > 0) 
and underestimates the consumption of the 
leisure good (b2 < 0). Naiveté therefore leads 
to mispredictions of future usage.
I now present evidence on the consump-
tion of investment goods (exercise and home-
works) and leisure goods (credit card take-up 
and life-cycle savings) that can be interpreted 
in light of this simple model.
2.1.3 Exercise 
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) use data 
from three U.S. health clubs offering a choice 
between a monthly contract XM with lump-
sum fee L of approximately $80 per month and 
no payment per visit, and a pay-per-visit con-
tract Xp with fee p of $10. Denote by E(xM) | XM 
the expected number of monthly visits under 
the monthly contract XM. Under the standard 
model, individuals choosing the monthly 
contract must believe that pE(xM) | X M ≥ L, or 
L/E(xM) | X M ≤ p: the price per expected atten-
dances under the monthly contract should be 
lower than the fee under payment-per-usage. 
Otherwise, the  individual should have chosen 
the pay-per-usage treatment. DellaVigna and 
Malmendier (2006), however, find that health 
club users that choose the monthly contract 
XM attend only 4.4 times per month. These 
users pay $17 per visit even though they could 
pay $10 per visit, a puzzle for the standard 
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model. A model with partially naive (β, δ) 
members suggests two explanations for this 
finding. The users may be purchasing a com-
mitment device to exercise more: the monthly 
membership reduces the marginal cost of a 
visit from $10 to $0, and helps to align actual 
attendance in (3) with desired attendance in 
(2). Alternatively, these agents may be overes-
timating their future health club attendance, 
as in (4). Direct survey evidence on expecta-
tion of attendance and evidence on contract 
renewal are most consistent with the latter 
interpretation.5
2.1.4 Homework and Deadlines 
Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch (2002) 
present evidence on homework completion 
and deadlines. The subjects are fifty-one pro-
fessionals enrolled in a section of a semester-
long executive education class at Sloan (MIT), 
with three homeworks as a requirement. At 
the beginning of the semester, they set bind-
ing deadlines (with a cost of lower grades for 
delay) for each of the homeworks. According 
to the standard model, they should set dead-
lines for the last day of the semester: there 
is no benefit to setting early deadlines, since 
they do not receive feedback on the home-
works, and there is a cost of lower flexibil-
ity. (A maximization without constraints is 
always preferable to one with constraints.) 
According to a model of self-control, instead, 
the deadlines provide a useful commitment 
device. Since homework completion is an 
investment good (b2 > 0), individuals spend 
less time on it than they wish to ex ante (com-
pare  equations (2) and (3)). A deadline forces 
the future self to spend more time on the 
assignment. The results support the self-con-
trol model: 68 percent of the deadlines are 
5 In section 5, I discuss how the contracts offered by 
health club companies are consistent with the assumption 
of naive (β, δ) consumers (DellaVigna and Malmendier 
2004).
set for weeks prior to the last week, indicat-
ing a demand for commitment.6
This result leaves open two issues. First, 
do the self-set deadlines improve perfor-
mance relative to a setting with no deadlines? 
Second, is the deadline setting optimal? 
If the individuals are partially naive about 
the self-control, they will underestimate 
the demand for commitment (equation (4)). 
In a second (laboratory) experiment, Ariely 
and Wertenbroch (2002) address both issues. 
Sixty students complete three proofreading 
assignments within twenty-one days. The 
control group can turn in each assignment at 
any time within the twenty-one days, a first 
treatment group can choose three deadlines 
(as in the class-room setting described above), 
and a second treatment group faces equal-
spaced deadlines. The first result is that self-
set deadlines indeed improve performance: 
the first treatment group does significantly 
better than the control group, detecting 
50 percent more errors (on average, 105 ver-
sus 70) and earning substantially more as a 
result (on average, $13 versus $5). The sec-
ond result is that the deadline setting is not 
optimal: the group with equal-spaced dead-
lines does significantly better than the other 
groups, on average detecting 130 errors and 
earning $20. This provides evidence of par-
tial naiveté about the self-control problems.
2.1.5 Credit Card Take-Up 
Lawrence M. Ausubel (1999) provides 
evidence on credit card usage using a large-
scale field experiment run by a credit card 
company. The company mailed randomized 
credit card offers, varying both the  preteaser 
and the postteaser interest rates. For example, 
compared to an offer of 6.9 percent interest 
6 Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) also compare the per-
formance in this section to the performance in another 
section with equal-spaced deadlines, with results similar 
to the ones described below. However, the students are 
not randomly assigned to the two sections.
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rate for six months and 16 percent thereaf-
ter (the control group), the treatment group 
“Pre” received a lower preteaser rate (4.9 per-
cent followed by 16 percent); the treatment 
group “Post,” instead, received a lower post-
teaser rate (6.9 percent followed by 14 per-
cent). For each offer, Ausubel (1999) observes 
the response rate and tweny-one months of 
history of borrowing for the individuals that 
take the card. Across these offers, the aver-
age balance borrowed in the first six months 
is about $2,000, while the average balance 
in the subsequent fifteen months is about 
$1,000.7 Given these borrowing rates, the 
standard theory predicts that the increase 
in response rate for treatment “Pre” (relative 
to the control group) should be smaller than 
for treatment “Post”: neglecting compounded 
interest, 6/12 × 2 percent × $2,000 is smaller 
than 15/12 × 2 percent × $1,000 (the com-
parison would only be more favorable for the 
“Post” treatment if we could observe the bal-
ances past twenty-one months). Instead, the 
increase in take-up rate for the “Pre” treat-
ment (386 people out of 100,000) is 2.5 times 
larger than the increase for the “Post” treat-
ment (154 people out of 100,000). Individuals 
overrespond to the preteaser interest rate. 
Ausubel’s interpretation of this result is that 
individuals (naively) believe that they will not 
borrow much on a credit card, past the teaser 
period. These findings are consistent with 
underestimation of future consumption for 
leisure goods, as in equation (4).
2.1.6 Life-Cycle Savings 
The (β, δ) model of self-control can also 
help explain puzzling features of life-cycle 
accumulation and credit-card borrowing 
7 Of course, the differences in interest rates will affect 
the borrowing directly, through incentive and selection 
effects. However, these differences are small enough in 
the data that we can, to a first approximation, neglect 
them in these calculations.
data. Building on Laibson (1997) and George-
Marios Angeletos et al. (2001), Laibson, 
Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman 
(2009) estimate a fully specified model of 
life-cycle accumulation with liquid and illiq-
uid saving. They show that the (β, δ) model 
can reconcile two facts: high credit card bor-
rowing (11.7 percent of annual income) and 
substantial illiquid wealth accumulation (216 
percent of annual income for the median con-
sumer of age 50–59).8 Standard models have 
a hard time explaining both facts, since credit 
card borrowing implies high impatience, 
which is at odds with substantial wealth accu-
mulation. The model with self-control prob-
lems predicts high spending on liquid assets, 
but also a high demand for illiquid assets, 
which work as commitment devices.
Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley 
Yin (2006) document directly the demand 
for illiquid savings as a commitment device, 
and its effect. They offer an account with a 
commitment device to 842 randomly deter-
mined households in the Philippines with a 
pre-existent bank account. Access to funds 
in these accounts is constrained to reach-
ing a self-specified savings goal or a self-
specified time period. A control group of 
466 households from the same sample is 
offered a verbal encouragement to save but 
no commitment. The results reveal a sizable 
demand for commitment, and an impact of 
commitment on savings. In the treatment 
group, 202 of 842 households take up the 
commitment savings product. In the 842 
treatment households, savings in the bank 
after six months are  significantly more likely 
to increase, compared to the 466 control 
households that received a pure encourage-
ment: the share of households with increased 
savings is 33.3 percent in the treatment and 
8 The figures (from Laibson et al. 2006) refer to high-
school graduates.
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27.7 in the  control.9 The comparison includes 
individuals in the treatment group that do 
not take up the commitment savings prod-
uct; the treatment-on-the-treated estimate 
is larger by a factor of 842/202. Thaler and 
Shlomo Benartzi (2004), described in sec-
tion 5 below, provide evidence of substantial 
demand for commitment devices in retire-
ment savings in the United States.
Paige Marta Skiba and Tobacman (2008) 
examine the role of self-control in the demand 
for payday loans, one of the fastest-growing 
sources of credit in the United States, with 
ten million households borrowing in 2002. 
These loans provide (typically) two weeks 
of liquidity for annualized (compounded) 
interest rates of over 7000 percent. Using an 
administrative data set from a payday lender, 
Skiba and Tobacman (2008) fit a life-cycle 
consumption model to the observed borrow-
ing behavior. While an exponential time dis-
counting model with a high discount rate can 
rationalize the observed borrowing at a high 
interest rate, it has difficulty explaining the 
relatively low default rate. Defaulting borrow-
ers have on average already repaid or serviced 
five payday loans, making interest payments 
of 90 percent of their original loan’s princi-
pal. Impatient but time-consistent borrowers 
would take advantage of default sooner, or 
borrow less. The observed facts are most con-
sistent with a model of partially naive (β, δ) 
consumers. These consumers borrow today 
expecting to borrow less in the future and 
procrastinate defaulting (which is assumed to 
have immediate monetary or stigma costs).
2.1.7 Default Effects in 401(k)s 
The impact of the status quo (default) in 
retirement savings is the final set of findings 
9 These figures refer to the total bank balance across 
all accounts for a household, that is, they are not due 
to switches of savings from an ordinary account to the 
account with commitment device.
bearing on self-control problems, as I discuss 
below.10 Brigitte Madrian and Dennis F. Shea 
(2001) consider the effect on the contribution 
rates in 401(k)s of a change in default. Before 
the change, the default is nonparticipation 
in retirement savings; after the change, the 
default is participation at a 3 percent rate in 
a money market fund. In both cases, employ-
ees can override the default with a phone 
call or by filing a form; also, in both cases, 
contributions receive a 50 percent match up 
to 6 percent of compensation. Madrian and 
Shea (2001) find that the change in default 
has a very large impact: one year after join-
ing the company, the participation rate in 
401(k)s is 86 percent for the treatment group 
and 49 percent for the control group.
James J. Choi et al. (2004) show that these 
findings generalize to six companies in differ-
ent industries with remarkably similar effect 
sizes. This finding is not limited to retire-
ment choices in the United States. Henrik 
Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) examine the 
choice of retirement funds in Sweden after 
the privatization of social security in the year 
2000. They find that 43.3 percent of new 
participants choose the default plan, despite 
the fact that the government encouraged 
individual choice, and despite the availability 
of 456 plans. Three years later, after the end 
of the advertisement campaign encouraging 
individual choice, the proportion choosing 
the default plan increased to 91.6 percent. 
Overall, the finding of large default effects is 
one of the most robust results in the applied 
economics literature of the last ten years.11
What explains the large default effect 
for retirement savings? Transaction costs 
10 William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser (1988) 
is an early paper documenting default effects.
11 Default effects matter in other decisions, such 
as contractual choice in health clubs (DellaVigna and 
Malmendier 2006), organ donation (Eric J. Johnson and 
Daniel Goldstein 2003; Alberto Abadie and Sebastien 
Gay 2006), and car insurance plan choice (Johnson et al. 
1993).
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alone are unlikely to explain default effects. 
Employees can change their retirement 
decisions at any time using the phone or a 
written form. Such small transaction costs 
are dwarfed by the tax advantages of 401(k) 
investments, particularly in light of the 50 
percent match (up to 6 percent of compensa-
tion) in place at the Madrian and Shea (2001) 
company. At a mean compensation of about 
$40,000, the match provides a yearly benefit 
of $1,200, assuming a discount rate equal to 
the interest rate. It is hard to imagine trans-
action costs of this size.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b and 2001) 
show that self-control problems, combined 
with naiveté, can explain the observed 
default effect even for small transaction costs. 
Consider a naive (β, δ) agent that has to decide 
when to undertake a decision with immediate 
disutility from transaction costs b1 < 0 and 
delayed benefit b2 > 0, such as enrolling in 
retirement savings. This agent would rather 
postpone this activity, given the self-con-
trol problems, as in equation (3). Moreover, 
this agent is (incorrectly) convinced that if 
she does not do the activity today, she’ll do 
it tomorrow, as in equation (4). This agent 
postpones the activity day-after-day, ending 
up never doing it. O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(2001) show that, in the presence of naiveté, 
even a small degree of self-control problems 
can generate (infinite) procrastination. These 
papers distinguish between “procrastina-
tion” and “delay”: procrastination is a delay 
that ex ante the agent does not anticipate. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) presents 
calibrations in a deterministic setup, which 
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) extend to 
the case of stochastic transaction costs. Both 
papers show that naive (β, δ) agents accu-
mulate substantial delays in a costly activity 
(respectively, signing up for a 401(k) and can-
celing a health club membership).
Both self-control problems and naiveté 
are required to explain the observed default 
effects. Unlike naive agents, sophisticated 
(β, δ) agents do not exhibit large default 
effects for reasonable parameter values 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001). While sophis-
ticated agents would like to postpone activi-
ties with immediate costs, they realize that 
doing an activity now is better than postpon-
ing it for a long time.12
If procrastination of a financial transaction 
is indeed responsible for the default effects 
in Madrian and Shea (2001) and in Choi et 
al. (2004), we should expect that, if individu-
als were forced to make an active choice at 
enrollment, they would display their true 
preferences for savings. In this case, they 
bear the transaction cost whether they invest 
or not, and hence investing does not have an 
immediate cost, i.e., b1 = 0. In this situation, 
the short-run self does not desire to postpone 
the choice. Gabriel D. Carroll et al. (forth-
coming) analyze a company that required its 
employees to choose the retirement savings at 
enrollment. Under this Active Decision plan, 
80 percent of workers enrolled in a 401(k) 
within one year of joining the company. Later, 
this company switched to a no-investment 
default, and the one-year enrollment rate 
declined to 50 percent. Requiring workers 
to choose, therefore, produces an enrollment 
rate that is only slightly lower than under the 
automatic enrollment in Madrian and Shea 
(2001).13
12 There are a number of alternative interpretations 
of the observed default effects, such as inattention and 
limited memory about 401(k) investment. However, most 
explanations are unlikely to match the magnitudes of the 
delay. For example, consider a sophisticated agent with 
limited memory. Being rational, she is aware that, if she 
does not sign up at employment, she will not sign up until 
the next time she remembers. If the anticipated delay is 
long enough, the agent prefers to sign up immediately, 
hence exhibiting very limited default effects. A model of 
limited memory with added naiveté explains the findings 
in a similar way to the naive (β, δ) model.
13 The effect of the Active Decision may also be due 
to a deadline effect for naive (β, δ) employees, who know 
that the next occasion to enroll will not be until several 
months later.
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2.1.8 Welfare 
These studies have welfare and policy 
implications. They suggest that savings rates 
for retirement in the United States may be 
low due to a combination of procrastina-
tion and defaults set to no savings. The (β, δ) 
model implies that the individuals are likely 
to be happier with defaults set to higher sav-
ings rates. A change in policy with defaults 
set to automatic enrollment is an example of 
cautious paternalism (Camerer et al. 2003) 
in that it helps substantially individuals with 
self-control problems and inflicts little or 
no harm on individuals without self-control 
problems. These individuals can switch to a 
different savings rate for a low transaction 
cost. In section 5, I present the results of a 
plan with automatic enrollment and other 
features designed to increase savings (Thaler 
and Benartzi 2004). An alternative design 
could be based on the requirement to make 
an active choice, as in Carroll et al. (forth-
coming). Social Security is a commitment 
device to save, albeit one that consumers 
cannot opt out of, and that thus can hurt con-
sumers with no self-control problems.
2.1.9 Summary 
A model of self-control problems with partial 
naiveté can rationalize a number of findings 
that are puzzling to the standard exponential 
model: (1) excessive preference for member-
ship contracts in health clubs; (2) positive 
effect of deadlines on homework grades and 
preference for deadlines; (3) near neglect of 
postteaser interest rates in credit-card take-up; 
(4) liquid debt and illiquid  saving in life-cycle 
accumulation; (5) demand for illiquid savings 
as commitment devices; and (6) default effects 
in retirement savings and in other settings.
The partially naive (β, δ) model, therefore, 
does a good job of explaining qualitative pat-
terns across a variety of settings involving self-
control. A frontier of this research agenda is 
to establish whether one model can fit these 
different facts not just qualitatively, but also 
quantitatively. Quantitative calibrations, for 
example, are crucial to understand default 
effects. Pursuing this agenda further, a few 
papers have estimated values for the time 
preference parameters. Laibson, Repetto, 
and Tobacman (2009) estimate annual time 
preference parameters (β = .70, δ = .96) on 
life-cycle accumulation data. M. Daniele 
Paserman (2008), building on DellaVigna 
and Paserman (2005), uses job search data 
to estimate (β = .40, δ = .99) for low-wage 
workers and (β = .89, δ = .99) for high-wage 
workers. Both papers assume sophistica-
tion. Skiba and Tobacman (2008) allow for 
partial naiveté and estimate (β = .53,   ˆ      β = 
.90, δ = .45) for the sample of payday loan 
borrowers.14
2.2 Reference Dependence
The simplest version of the standard model 
as in equation (1) assumes that individuals 
maximize a global utility function over life-
time consumption U (x | s).
2.2.1 Laboratory Experiments 
A set of experiments on attitude toward 
risk call into question the assumption of a 
global utility function. An example (using 
hypothetical questions) from Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) illustrates the point. A group 
of seventy subjects is asked to consider the 
situation: “In addition to whatever you own, 
you have been given 1,000. You are now 
asked to choose between A: (1,000, .50), 
and B: (500),” where (1,000, .50) indicates a 
lottery that assigns .50 probability of 1,000 
and .50 probability of 0. A different group of 
sixty-eight subjects is asked to consider: “In 
 addition to whatever you own, you have been 
14 In Paserman (2008) (respectively, Skiba and 
Tobacman 2008), the model is estimated at the weekly 
(biweekly) level, so the β parameter refers to the one-week 
(two-week) discounting. The δ parameter is the annual-
ized equivalent.
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given 2,000. You are now asked to choose 
between C: (–1,000, .50), and D: (–500).” The 
allocations A and C are identical, and so are 
B and D. However, in the first group, only 16 
percent of the subjects choose A, in contrast 
with 69 percent of subjects choosing C in the 
second group. Clearly, framing matters (see 
also section 4.1).
Choices in lotteries with real payoffs dis-
play similar violation of the standard theory. 
In Fehr and Lorenz Goette (2007), 27 out 
of 42 subjects prefer 0 Swiss francs for sure 
to the lottery (–5, p = .5; 8, p = .5). Under 
the standard model, this implies an unrea-
sonably high level of risk aversion (Rabin 
2000). A subject that made this choice for 
all wealth levels would also reject the lottery 
(–31, p = .5; ∞, p = .5), which offers an infi-
nite payout with probability .5.
2.2.2 Model 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in the sec-
ond most cited article in economics since 
1970 (E. Han Kim, Adair Morse, and Luigi 
Zingales 2006), propose a reference-depen-
dent model of preferences that, unlike the 
standard model, can fit most of the experi-
mental evidence on lottery choice. According 
to prospect theory, subjects evaluate a lot-
tery (y, p; z, 1 − p) as follows: π (p) v(y − r) + 
π (1 − p) v(z − r). Prospect theory is char-
acterized by: (1) reference dependence—the 
value function v is defined over differences 
from a reference point r, instead of over the 
overall wealth; (2) loss aversion—the value 
function v(x) has a kink at the reference point 
and is steeper for losses (x < 0) than for gains 
(x > 0); (3) diminishing sensitivity—the value 
function v is concave over gains and convex 
over losses, reflecting diminishing sensitiv-
ity to outcomes further from the reference 
point; and (4) probability weighting—the 
decisionmaker transforms the probabilities 
with a probability-weighting function π(p) 
that overweights small probabilities and 
underweights large probabilities.
The four features of prospect theory are 
designed to capture the evidence on risk-
taking, including risk aversion over gains, 
risk-seeking over losses, and contemporane-
ous preference for insurance and gambling. 
It can also capture framing effects as in the 
example above. Lottery A is evaluated as 
π (.5) v(1,000) and hence, given the concavity 
of v(x) for positive x and given π (.5) ≈ .5, is 
inferior to lottery B, valued v(500). Conversely, 
lottery C is evaluated as π (.5) v(−1,000) and, 
given the convexity of v(x) for negative x, is 
preferred to lottery D.
The large majority of the follow-up lit-
erature, however, adopts a simplified ver-
sion of prospect theory incorporating only 
features (1) and (2). The subjects maxi-
mize  ∑ i    pi v(xi | r), where v(x | r) is defined as
(5) v(x | r) = {   
x − r
   λ(x − r)     
if x ≥ r
   if x < r   
where λ > 1 denotes the loss aversion param-
eter. Prospect theory, even in the simplified 
version of expression (5), can explain the 
aversion to small risk exhibited experimen-
tally, as in the example above from Fehr and 
Goette (2007). A prospect-theoretic subject 
evaluates the lottery (–5, .5; 8, .5) as .5λ 
× (−5) + .5 × 8 = 4 − 2.5λ. This subject 
prefers the status quo for λ > 8/5. (The 
experimental evidence from Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) suggests λ ≈ 2.25).
A fifth feature of reference-dependent pref-
erences is narrow framing (Barberis, Ming 
Huang, and Thaler 2006; Rabin and Georg 
Weizsäcker forthcoming). According to the 
standard economic model, a  decisionmaker 
offered a gamble integrates the risk induced 
by the gamble with the other sources of uncer-
tainty she faces. For example, a bike messenger 
in Fehr and Goette (2007) offered the lottery 
(–5, p = .5; 8, p = .5) should aggregate these 
risky earnings with the (highly volatile) earn-
ings from the job, fluctuations in the value of 
the assets, etc. to determine how the lottery 
affects consumption utility. If she did so, even 
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if she evaluated the lottery according to pros-
pect theory, she would be very likely to accept 
the gamble (counterfactually). The background 
risk implies that the bike messenger is unlikely 
to be near the kink at the reference point; as 
such, she is affected only to a limited extent by 
the loss aversion. Barberis, Huang, and Thaler 
(2006) formalizes this argument showing that 
even nonexpected utility theories that display 
first-order risk aversion (including prospect 
theory) do not accommodate the observed 
risk-taking behavior in the laboratory, unless 
one assumes narrow framing.
A decisionmaker with Narrow Framing, 
instead, considers each risk in isolation and 
evaluates a lottery as if it were the only deter-
minant of consumption. Indeed, this assump-
tion is implicit in evaluating the lottery in Fehr 
and Goette (2007) as .5 λ × (−5) + .5 × 8 (as 
we did above). Importantly, this assumption is 
routinely used in experimental papers (with-
out explicit reference to narrow framing) to 
recover consumer preferences from observed 
behavior, in that all income from outside the 
experiment is ignored, e.g., Charles A. Holt 
and Susan K. Laury (2002). I discuss further 
the role of framing in section 4.1.
I assume narrow framing in the following 
applications to economic phenomena, and dis-
cuss the application of reference dependence 
also to settings that do not involve risk (such 
as the endowment effect and labor supply).
2.2.3 Endowment Effect 
A finding consistent with prospect theory 
and inconsistent with the standard model 
is the so-called endowment effect, an asym-
metry in willingness to pay (WTP) and will-
ingness to accept (WTA). In a laboratory 
experiment, Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1990) randomly allocate mugs 
to one group of subjects. They use an incen-
tive-compatible procedure to elicit the WTA 
for subjects that received the mug, and the 
WTP for subjects that were not allocated 
the mug. According to the standard theory, 
the two valuations should on average be the 
same. The median WTA of $5.75, however, is 
twice as large as the median WTP of $2.25. 
Since theoretically wealth effects could 
explain this discrepancy, in a different experi-
ment Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler intro-
duce choosers, alongside buyers and sellers. 
Choosers, who are not endowed with a mug, 
choose between a mug and a sum of money; 
the experimenters elicit the price that induces 
indifference. Their choice is formally identi-
cal to the choice of the sellers (except for the 
fact that the choosers are not endowed with 
the mug); hence, according to the standard 
theory, the sum of money that makes them 
indifferent should correspond to the WTA of 
sellers. Instead, in this experiment the median 
WTA for sellers is $7.12, while the price for 
choosers is $3.12 (and the WTP for buyers is 
$2.87). The asymmetry between WTA and 
WTP, replicated in a number of studies, has 
important implications for economics such as 
low volume of trades in markets and inconsis-
tencies in the elicitation of contingent valua-
tions in environmental decisions.
The endowment effect is predicted by a 
reference-dependent utility function with 
loss-aversion λ > 1. We assume that the 
subjects do not exhibit loss aversion with 
respect to money.15 Assume that the  utility 
of the subjects is u(1) if they received a mug, 
and u(0) otherwise, with u(1) > u(0). Consider 
subjects with a piece-wise linear utility func-
tion (5), where the reference point r depends 
on whether the subjects were assigned a mug. 
Subjects with the mug have reference point 
r = 1 and assign utility u(1) − u(1) = 0 to keep-
ing the mug and utility λ[u(0) − u(1)] + pWTA 
to selling the mug for the sum pWTA. Subjects 
without the mug have reference point r = 0 and 
15 Subjects in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) 
do not exhibit the endowment effect with respect to tokens 
of monetary value. In the presence of loss aversion λ also 
with respect to money, the endowment effect is magni-
fied: pWTA = λpC = λ2pWTP .
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assign value u(1) − u(0) − pWTP to getting the 
mug at price pWTP and utility u(0) − u(0) = 0 to 
keeping the status quo. The prices that make 
both groups of subjects indifferent between 
having and not having the mug are 
 pWTA = λ[u(1) − u(0)] and
 pWTP = u(1) − u(0),
hence pWTA = λpWTP . A loss-aversion param- 
eter λ = 5.75/2.25 fits the evidence in 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990). 
Notice that choosers choose a mug if 
u(1) − u(0) ≥ pC, and hence pC = pWTP with 
referent-dependent preferences, approxi-
mately as observed.
Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler (2005) 
criticize this set of experiments on the ground 
that the endowment effect may be due to pro-
cedural features, such as limited experience 
and lack of anonymity. They elicit the WTP 
and WTA for a mug after granting anonymity 
and providing practice. In addition, in two of 
three sessions they provide extensive training 
consisting of fourteen rounds of elicitation of 
WTA and WTP for lotteries. In contrast to 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), they 
find no evidence of the endowment effect for 
mugs, with a mean WTA of $5.56 and a mean 
WTP of $6.62. Plott and Zeiler interpret this 
result as suggesting that, once one allows for 
experience and anonymity, the endowment 
effect disappears. However, an alternative 
interpretation is that their procedure does not 
generate an endowment effect because they 
did not vary the “endowment” sufficiently. 
Namely, both WTA and WTP groups are 
given a mug at the beginning of the experi-
ment (though only the WTA group is told 
that they own it).16 In addition, while Plott 
16 Consistent with this hypothesis, Knetsch and Wei-
Kang Wong (forthcoming) replicate Plott and Zeiler 
(2005)’s results if they follow the same endowment 
 procedure, but obtain a strong endowment effect if they 
and Zeiler (2005) do not obtain any endow-
ment effect for mugs, they find a significant 
endowment effect in the lottery rounds, as 
Andrea Isoni, Graham Loomes, and Robert 
Sugden (2008) point out. In Isoni, Loomes, 
and Sugden (2008)’s replication of the Plott 
and Zeiler (2005) procedure, the mean WTA 
for lotteries is larger than the mean WTP by 
a factor of between 1.02 and 2.19, a substan-
tial endowment effect. Isoni, Loomes, and 
Sugden (2008) also find some evidence (albeit 
insignificant) of an endowment effect for 
mugs (mean WTA over mean WTP of 1.19). 
Additional research will be needed to explain 
the discrepancies between these findings. 
In any case, the Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1990) results are relevant to a num-
ber of economic decisions where anonymity 
is not perfect and experience is limited, such 
as buying or selling a house.
A different set of papers in this literature 
examines the endowment effect in the field, 
namely a sports card fair in List (2003 and 
2004). By selection, the participants in a 
sports card fair have at least some experi-
ence with cards, but some subjects are more 
experienced than others.17 The design is as 
follows. List (2003) randomly assigns sports 
memorabilia A or B as compensation for 
filling out a questionnaire. After the ques-
tionnaire is filled out, the participants are 
asked whether they would like to switch 
their assigned memorabilia for the other one. 
Since the objects are chosen to be of com-
parable value, the standard model predicts 
trade about 50 percent of the time. Instead, 
subjects with  below-average trading experi-
ence switch only 6.8 percent of the time. This 
provides evidence of the endowment effect 
in a natural economic setting where the 
place objects in front of the “owners” only. (Although the 
latter treatment changes the wording too, making it dif-
ficult to disentangle the effects.)
17 In List (2003), experienced subjects are those with 
self-reported frequency of card trading of at least six times 
a month, the mean in the sample.
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subjects are familiar with the objects being 
traded and with trading itself. This suggests 
that familiarity with the object and proce-
dures is unlikely to be responsible for the dif-
ferences between the results of Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) and Plott and 
Zeiler (2005).
List (2003) then examines the behavior 
of subjects with high trading experience. 
These subject are not only familiar with the 
objects but also trade cards at least six times 
a month. Unlike the less experienced trad-
ers, these subjects switch 46.7 percent of the 
time, displaying no endowment effect. The 
difference between the two groups is not 
due to the fact that inexperienced traders are 
approximately indifferent between the two 
memorabilia and, hence, willing to stick to 
the status quo. In another treatment elicit-
ing WTA and WTP, the WTA is substantially 
larger than the WTP for inexperienced sub-
jects (18.53 versus 3.32), but not for expe-
rienced subjects (8.15 versus 6.27). Next, 
List (2003) attempts to test whether the dif-
ference between the two groups is due to 
self-selection of subjects without the endow-
ment effect among the frequent traders or 
is a causal effect of trading experience. In a 
follow-up study performed months later, the 
endowment effect decreases in the trading 
experience accumulated in the intervening 
months, supporting the latter interpretation. 
Finally, and most surprisingly, List (2004) 
shows that the more experienced card trad-
ers also display substantially less endowment 
effect with respect to other goods, such as 
chocolates and mugs.
Overall, the evidence in List (2003 and 
2004) suggests that the endowment effect 
is a feature of trading behavior that  market 
experience can temper.18 This evidence 
leaves open (at least) two interpretations. 
One interpretation is that experience with 
18 I discuss the role of experience further in the 
conclusion.
the market leads individuals to become 
aware of their loss aversion, and counteract 
it: experience mitigates loss aversion. A very 
different interpretation is that experience 
does not affect loss aversion, but it impacts 
the reference-point formation. Assume that 
experienced traders expect to trade the 
object that they are assigned with probabil-
ity .5, independent of which group they are 
assigned to. As in Botond Köszegi and Rabin 
(2006), subjects have a stochastic reference 
point, r = 1 with probability .5 and r = 0 
otherwise. For individuals assigned the good, 
the (expected) value of keeping the good is 
.5 × [u(1) − u(0)] + .5 [u(1) − u(1)] = .5 [u(1) 
− u(0)]; the (expected) value of selling the 
good .5 × [u(0) − u(0) + pWTA ] + .5 [λ(u(0) − u(1)) + pWTA ] = .5 [λ(u(0) − u(1))] + pWTA. 
This implies pWTA = .5 (1 + λ) [u(1) − u(0)]. It 
is easy to show with similar calculation that
 pWTP = .5 (1 +λ) [u(1) − u(0)] = pWTA.
If experienced subjects have rational expec-
tations about their reference point (Köszegi 
and Rabin 2006), they exhibit no endow-
ment effect, even if they are loss averse. The 
follow-up literature should consider carefully 
the determination of the reference point.
2.2.4 Housing Market 
For homeowners who are deciding the 
sale price of a house, the initial purchase 
price is likely to be a salient reference point. 
Loss aversion induces the homeowners 
that would sell at a loss to ask for a higher 
sale price. To illustrate this point, consider 
a model in which a higher sale price P has 
two effects: (1) it increases the utility of sale 
U(P), conditional on a sale, and (2) it lowers 
the probability p(P) of a sale (p′(P) < 0). The 
homeowner maximizes maxP p(P)U (P) + 
(1 − p(P))  __ U , where  __ U is the reservation util-
ity. The optimal price P* equates the mar-
ginal gain of increasing the price, p(P)U′(P), 
to the marginal cost, −p′(P)(U(P) −  __ U ). 
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Consider a piece-wise linear utility as in (5). 
For P ≥ P0, the owner equates p(P) and −p′(P)(P − P0 − __ U ) (notice that  __ U could be 
negative and can depend on P0 since we have 
normalized U(P) to equal 0 for P = P0). For 
P < P0, instead, the owner compares p(P)λ 
and −p′(P)(λ(P − P0) −  __ U ). For a standard 
risk-neutral agent (λ = 1), the two conditions 
coincide, leading to a solution P*RN. For a loss-
averse agent (λ > 1), however, for a price P 
below the reference price P0, the marginal 
benefit of a higher price increases discontin-
uously from p(P) to p(P)λ, while the marginal 
cost decreases. Both effects imply that, if in 
the risk-neutral case the solution P*RN was to 
sell at a price lower than P0, the loss-averse 
owner sells at a higher price P*LA > P*RN. Loss 
aversion, hence, leads to higher sale prices 
for units that would sell at a loss because the 
agent feels a higher marginal disutility of 
money.
David Genesove and Christopher Mayer 
(2001) provide evidence on this phenomenon 
using data on sales of Boston condominiums 
in the years 1990–97. The identification is pro-
vided by a housing market boom (1983–87) 
followed by a slump (1989–92). This pattern 
induces substantial variation in the purchase 
price P0 even for otherwise comparable 
units, depending on the year of purchase. 
Hence, some of the sellers expect to make 
a loss relative to the original purchase price 
when selling at the predicted price  ˆ  
   
 P, while 
other sellers expect a gain. The authors then 
test whether the listing price (relative to the 
predicted price) is higher for units for which 
the predicted price  ˆ  
   
 P falls below the original 
price P0, controlling for the characteristics 
of the unit. In doing so, the authors face the 
complication that the predicted sale price  ˆ  
   
 P
is noisily estimated. Importantly, unobserv-
able unit quality would bias the estimates 
toward finding the result, since unobservably 
good units are more likely to appear to be sell-
ing at a loss (since P0 will be high for these 
units) and are more likely to sell above the 
predicted price. Even after accounting for this 
bias, the authors find that the listing price for 
units predicted to sell at a loss is significantly 
above the predicted value. The magnitude is 
large: a 1 percent predicted loss translates into 
a .25 percent higher listing price. This result is 
larger for units owned by individuals than for 
units owned by investor, suggesting a mitigat-
ing impact of experience as in List (2003 and 
2004). The higher listing price translates into 
both a longer time on the market and a higher 
final transaction price (though the latter effect 
is, as expected, smaller relative to the effect 
on the listing price). These findings are, there-
fore, consistent with the reference-dependent 
model with loss aversion outlined above. The 
authors do not test an additional prediction of 
the model above, bunching of the listing price 
at the initial purchase price P0.
2.2.5 Finance 
Two of the most important applications of 
reference-dependent preferences are to the 
field of finance.19 The first application is to 
the equity premium puzzle: equity returns 
outperformed bond returns by on average 
3.9 percentage points during the period 
1871–1993 (John Y. Campbell and John H. 
Cochrane 1999), a premium too large to be 
reconciled with the standard model, except for 
extremely high risk aversion (Rajnish Mehra 
and Edward C. Prescott 1985). Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) use a calibration20 to show 
that this premium is instead consistent with 
what loss-averse investors require to invest 
in stocks, provided that they evaluate their 
portfolio performance annually. At horizons 
as short as a year, the likelihood that stocks 
underperform relative to bonds requires a 
substantial compensation in terms of returns, 
given loss aversion. At a longer horizon, the 
19 Barberis and Thaler (2003) present a more compre-
hensive survey of these applications.
20 The calibration uses the loss-aversion parameter 
estimated from the experiments.
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLVII (June 2009)330
likelihood of underperformance decreases, 
and the implied equity premium decreases. 
In a paper that carefully formalizes the idea 
of Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, 
Huang, and Tano Santos (2001) show that 
reference-dependent preferences can indeed 
match the observed equity premium. This 
paper uses the simplified prospect-theory 
model with piece-wise linear function as in 
(5), relying on reference dependence and loss 
aversion for the predictions.
The second application is to the so-called 
disposition effect, which denotes the ten-
dency to sell “winners” and hold on to “los-
ers.” Terrance Odean (1998) documents this 
phenomenon using individual trading data 
from a discount brokerage house during the 
period 1987–93. Defining gains and losses 
relative to the purchase price of a share, 
Odean computes the share of realized gains 
PGR = (Realized Gains)/(Realized Gains 
+ Paper Gains) to equal .148. The share of 
realized losses PLR = (Realized Losses)/
(Realized Losses + Paper Losses) equals 
.098. Odean (1998) shows that the large dif-
ference between the propensity to realize 
gains (PGR) and the propensity to realize 
losses (PLR) is not due to portfolio rebalanc-
ing, to ex post higher returns for “losers” (if 
anything, “winners” outperform “losers”), or 
to transaction costs. The disposition effect 
is puzzling for the standard theory, since 
capital gain taxation would lead to expect 
that  investors liquidate “losers” sooner. 
This puzzle is a robust finding, replicated 
more recently by Zoran Ivkovich, James M. 
Poterba, and Scott Weisbenner (2005), who 
show that the effect is present in both taxable 
and tax-deferred accounts (though larger in 
tax-deferred accounts).
Prospect theory is a possible explanation for 
this phenomenon. The concavity over gains 
induces less risk taking for “winner” stocks 
and, hence, more sales of “winners.” The con-
vexity over losses induces more risk taking for 
“loser” stocks, and hence more purchases of 
“losers.” Barberis and Wei Xiong (forthcom-
ing), however, point out that this argument 
does not take into account the kink at the 
reference point. This kink induces high local 
risk-aversion that generates a pressure to sell 
both “losers” and “winners” around the ref-
erence point. Reference-dependent investors 
take this into account and enter the stock 
market only if expected returns are suffi-
ciently high. For high expected returns, how-
ever, “winners” are likely to be further from 
the reference point than “losers,” generating 
more pressure to sell (due to the closeness 
to the kink) for “losers,” contrary to the dis-
position effect. Indeed, Barberis and Xiong 
(forthcoming) simulate a calibrated model of 
reference-dependent preferences that takes 
these effects into account. They obtain the 
disposition effect only for certain ranges 
of the parameters and obtain the opposite 
pattern for most of the parameters. Their 
benchmark model assumes that investors, 
when evaluating the holdings, make no dis-
tinctions between realized gains/losses and 
“paper” gains/losses. Investors, however, may 
treat the two utility carriers asymmetrically 
and derive utility (or disutility) only from 
realized gains and losses. Investors may even 
go as far as distancing themselves from the 
paper losses. Niklas Karlsson, Loewenstein, 
and Duane J. Seppi (2005) show that inves-
tors are substantially less likely to look up 
their holding on the Internet when the 
stock market is doing poorly. If investors 
only evaluate losses when they realize them, 
as Barberis and Xiong (forthcoming) show 
with an extension of their model, reference-
dependent  preferences mostly produce the 
disposition effect patterns.
2.2.6 Labor Supply 
As a further application, we consider the 
response of labor supply to wage fluctuations. 
This response, in general, reflects a complex 
combination of income and substitution 
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effects (David Card 1994). Here, we con-
sider a simple case in which income effects 
can, to a first approximation, be neglected: 
jobs in which workers decide the labor sup-
ply daily, and in which the realization of the 
daily wage is idiosyncratic. Taxi drivers, for 
example, decide every day whether to drive 
for the whole shift or end earlier; the effec-
tive wage varies from day-to-day as the 
result of demand shifters such as weather 
and conventions. For these occupations, the 
income effect from (uncorrelated) changes 
in the daily wage is negligible, and we can 
neglect it by assuming a quasi-linear model. 
Each day, workers maximize the utility func-
tion u(Y) − θh2/2, where the daily earning Y 
equals hw, h is the number of hours worked, 
w is the daily wage, and θh2/2 is the (convex) 
cost of effort.
Following the simplified prospect theory 
formulation in (5), we assume that the util-
ity function u(Y) equals (Y – r) for Y ≥ r, 
and λ(Y − r) otherwise, where r is a target 
daily earning. Reference-dependent workers 
(λ > 1) are loss averse with respect to miss-
ing the daily target earning. For λ = 1, this 
model reduces to the standard model with 
risk-neutral workers.
In the standard model (λ = 1), workers 
maximize wh − θh2/2, yielding an upward-
sloping labor supply curve h* = w/θ. As the 
wage increases, so do the hours sup-
plied, in accordance to the substitution 
effect between leisure and consumption. A 
 reference-dependent worker (λ > 1), instead, 
exhibits a nonmonotonic labor supply func-
tion (figure 1). For a low wage (w <  √ ____ rθ/λ), 
the worker has not yet achieved the target 
earnings, and an increase in wage leads to an 
increase in hours worked (h* = λw/θ), as in the 
standard model. For a high wage (w >  √ __ rθ), 
the worker earns more than the target, and 
the labor supply is similarly upward-sloping, 
albeit flatter (h* = w/θ). For intermediate lev-
els of the wage ( √ ____ rθ/λ < w <  √ __ rθ), instead, 
the worker is content to earn exactly the 
daily target r. Any additional dollar earned 
makes it easier to reach the target and leads 
to reductions in the number of hours worked 
(h* = r/w); this generates a locally downward-
sloping labor supply function.
Camerer et al. (1997) use three data sets 
of hours worked and daily earnings for New 
York cab drivers to test whether the labor 
supply function is upward sloping, as the 
standard theory above implies, or downward 
sloping. Denote by Yi, t and hi, t the daily earn-
ings and the hours worked on day t by driver 
i. Camerer et al. (1997) estimate the OLS 
labor-supply equation
(6) log (hi, t) = α + β log (Yi, t/hi, t) 
 + Γ Xi, t + εi, t .
Increases in the daily wage, computed as 
Yi, t/hi, t, lead to decreases in the number 
of hours worked hi, t with estimated elas-
ticities in the three data sets of  ˆ  
   
 β = −.186 
(s.e. .129), −.618 (s.e. .051) and −.355 (s.e. 
.051). The authors conclude that the data 
reject the standard model (which predicts a 
positive elasticity), and support a reference-
dependent model with daily earnings as the 
reference point. As figure 1 shows, though, 
the labor supply function is not necessarily 
downward sloping for target earners, and 
it is almost certainly not log-linear, unlike 
in specification (6). Nevertheless, the find-
ing of a negative elasticity is consistent with 
reference-dependent preferences for shifts in 
labor demand corresponding to a wage in the 
interval  √ ____ θr/λ < w <  √ __ θr .
Specification (6) is open to two main 
criticisms. First, a negative elasticity  ˆ  
   
 β is 
expected if the daily fluctuations in wages for 
cab  drivers are due to shifters of labor sup-
ply (like rain that make driving less pleasant), 
rather than shifters of labor demand. As fig-
ure 2 illustrates, if labor supply shifts across 
days, the resulting equilibrium points plot out 
a downward-sloping curve even if the labor 
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supply function is upward sloping. Camerer 
et al. (1997) include controls for plausible 
labor supply shifters such as weekday and 
rain; they also use interviews of cab drivers 
to argue that the factors affecting the wage 
are unlikely to change the marginal cost of 
driving; however, in the absence of an instru-
ment for labor supply, this objection is a con-
cern. Second, specification (6) suffers from 
division bias, which biases downward the 
estimate of β. Since the daily wage is com-
puted as the ratio of daily earnings and hours 
worked and since hours worked is the left-
hand-side variable in (6), any measurement 
error in hi, t induces a mechanical downward 
bias in  ˆ  
   
 β. Camerer et al. (1997) address this 
objection by instrumenting the daily wage 
of worker i by the summary statistics of the 
daily wage of the other workers on the same 
shift. The estimates of β are still negative, 
though noisier.
Henry S. Farber (2005) uses a differ-
ent data set of 584 trip sheets for twenty-
one New York cab drivers and estimates a 
hazard model that does not suffer from divi-
sion bias. For any trip t within a day, Farber 
(2005) estimates the probability of stopping 
as a function of the number of hours worked 
hi, t and the daily cumulative earnings to that 
point, Yi, t:
 Stopi, t = Φ(α + βY Yi, t + βh hi, t + ΓXi, t),
where Φ is the c.d.f. of a standardized normal 
distribution. The standard theory predicts 
that βY should be zero (since earnings are not 
highly correlated within a day), while refer-
ence dependence predicts that βY should be 
positive. Farber (2005) finds that βY is posi-
tive ( ˆ 
   
 β  Y = .015), but not significantly so. 
While the author cannot reject the standard 
model, the point estimates are not negligible: 
a 10 percent increase in Yi, t (about $15) is 
predicted to increase the probability of stop-
ping by 15 × .015 = .225 percentage points, 
a 1.6 percent increase relative to the average 
of 14 percentage points. This corresponds to 








Figure 1. Labor Supply for Reference-Dependent Cab Driver and Market Equilibrium
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of .16. These findings do not contradict pros-
pect theory since Farber (2005) does not 
test the hypothesis that cab drivers have 
 reference-dependent preferences (failing to 
reject the null is different from rejecting the 
alternative hypothesis of prospect theory, 
especially in light of the positive point esti-
mates). In a more recent paper, Farber (2008) 
addresses this issue and tests, using the same 
data set, a simple model of labor supply that 
explicitly allows for reference- dependent 
preferences with a stochastic reference point. 
The findings provide weak evidence of ref-
erence dependence: the estimated model 
implies a loss-aversion coefficient λ signifi-
cantly larger than zero. At the same time, 
however, the estimated variation across days 
in the reference daily earning is large enough 
that reference dependence loses predictive 
power. It is an open question whether more 
precise data on the income targets, perhaps 
obtained via a survey or induced experimen-
tally, would help to identify reference-depen-
dence effects when combined with the labor 
supply decision.
Given the lack of an instrument for daily 
wage fluctuations, the evidence on the labor 







Figure 2. Market Equilibrium for Standard Cab Driver with Shifting Labor Supply
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debate on reference dependence and labor 
supply. Fehr and Goette (2007) provide new 
evidence using a field experiment on the 
labor supply of bike messengers. Like taxi 
drivers, bike messengers choose how long to 
work within a shift. Fehr and Goette (2007) 
randomly assign forty-four messengers into 
two groups. Each group receives a 25 per-
cent higher commission for the deliveries 
for just one month in two different months. 
This design solves both problems discussed 
above, since the increase in wage is exoge-
nous, and the wage and the actual deliveries 
are exactly measured.
Bike messengers in the treatment group 
respond in two ways to the exogenous (and 
anticipated) temporary increase in wage: (1) 
they work 30 percent more shifts; (2) within 
each shift, they do 6 percent fewer deliv-
eries. The first finding is consistent with 
both the standard model and the reference-
dependent model with daily targets. (When 
deciding on which day to work, reference-
dependent workers will sign up for shifts on 
days in which it is easier to reach the daily 
target.) The second finding is consistent 
with target earning and not with the stan-
dard model, which predicts an increase in 
the number of hours worked within each 
shift. This finding, however, is also con-
sistent with an extension of the standard 
model in which workers in the treatment 
group get more tired, and hence do fewer 
deliveries, because they work more shifts. 
Fehr and Goette (2007) provide additional 
evidence in support of reference-depen-
dence combining the field evidence with a 
laboratory experiment on risk-taking. The 
bike messengers that display loss aversion 
in the lab—i.e., they reject a (–5, .5; 8, .5) 
lottery—exhibit a more negative response 
(though not significantly so) in their deliv-
eries to the wage increase. This correlation 
is not predicted by the fatigue explanation, 
but is predicted by the reference depen-
dence model.
2.2.7 Insurance 
A puzzling feature of insurance behav-
ior is the pervasiveness of small-scale insur-
ance. Insurance policies on, for example, the 
 telephone wiring are commonplace despite 
the fact that, in case of an accident, the losses 
amount to at most $50 (Charles J. Cicchetti 
and Jeffrey A. Dubin 1994). This is a puz-
zle for expected utility, which implies local 
 risk-neutrality and hence no demand for small-
scale insurance (except in the unrealistic case 
of fair pricing). Justin Sydnor (2006) provides 
evidence of excess small-scale insurance for 
the $36 billion home insurance industry. Since 
mortgage companies require home insur-
ance, the consumer choice is limited to the 
level of deductible in a standard menu: $250 
versus $500 versus $1,000. Using a random 
sample of 50,000 members of a major insur-
ance company in one year, Sydnor documents 
that 83 percent of customers and 61 percent 
of new customers choose deductibles lower 
than $1,000. The modal homeowner chooses 
a $500 deductible, thereby paying on aver-
age $100 of additional premium relative to a 
$1,000 deductible. However, the claim rate is 
under 5 percent, which implies that the value 
of a low deductible is about $25 in expecta-
tion. The standard homeowner, therefore, is 
sacrificing $100 − $25 = $75 in expectations 
to insure against, at worst, a $500 − $100 = 
$400 risk.
This indicates a strong preference for insur-
ing against small risks that is a puzzle for the 
standard theory, unless one assumes three-
digit coefficients of relative risk  aversion. This 
deviation from the standard model involves 
substantial stakes. If, instead of choosing a low 
deductible, homeowners selected the $1000 
deductible from age 30 to age 65 and invested 
the money in a money market fund, their 
wealth at retirement would be $6,000 higher. 
Sydnor (2006) shows that a calibrated version 
of prospect-theory can match the findings by 
the  overweighting of the small probability of 
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an accident and the loss  aversion with respect 
to future  losses.21 The two components of 
prospect theory each account for about half 
of the observed discrepancy between the pre-
dicted and the observed willingness to pay for 
low deductibles. Social pressure by the sales-
men (who are paid a percentage of the pre-
mium as commission) may also contribute to 
the prevalence of low-deductible contracts.
2.2.8 Employment 
Alexandre Mas (2006) estimates the im- 
pact of reference points for the New Jersey 
police. In the 9 percent of cases in which the 
police and the municipality do not reach an 
agreement, the contract is determined by 
final offer arbitration. The police and the 
municipality submit their offers to the arbi-
trator, who has to choose one of the two 
offers. In theory (Mas 2006), if the disput-
ing parties are equally risk averse, the winner 
in arbitration is determined by a coin toss.22 
Mas (2006) exploits this prediction of quasi-
random assignment to present evidence on 
how police pay affects performance for 383 
arbitration cases from 1978 to 1995. In the 
cases in which the offer of the employer is 
chosen, the share of crimes solved by the 
police (the clearance rate) decreases by 12 
percent compared to the cases in which the 
police offer is chosen. The author also docu-
ments a smaller increase in crime. Lower pay 
therefore induces the police to devote less 
effort to fighting crime, a finding consistent 
with a number of interpretations, including 
efficiency wages and reciprocity.
21 Loss aversion could in principle go the other way, 
since individuals that are loss averse to paying a high pre-
mium may as well prefer the high deductible. Experimental 
evidence, however, suggests that consumers will adjust 
their reference point on the premium side, since they are 
expecting to pay the premium for sure, but cannot adjust 
the reference point on the future uncertain loss.
22 In reality, the arbitrator rules for the municipality in 
34.4 percent of cases, suggesting that the unions are more 
risk averse than the employers. The key result on refer-
ence dependence is independent of this assumption.
Mas (2006) then provides evidence that 
reference points mediate this effect, which 
depends more on expected wages than on 
actual wages. Mas generates a predicted 
award based on a set of observables as a proxy 
for the reference point, and computes how 
the clearance rate responds to  differences 
between the award and the predicted award. 
The response is significantly higher for cases 
in which the police loses—and hence is on 
the loss side—than for cases in which the 
police wins—and hence is on the gain side. 
This asymmetry is consistent with reference-
dependent preferences with loss aversion. 
Assume, for example, that the utility func- 
tion of the police is [V + v(w | r)] e − θe2/2, 
where v(w | r) captures the impact of the 
wage w on the desirability of effort; assume 
also that v(w | r) is reference dependent as in 
equation (5). This complementarity between 
police pay w and effort e in the utility func-
tion can be interpreted as reference-depen-
dent reciprocity. The first-order condition, 
then, implies e*(w) = [V + v(w | r)]/θ. Given 
loss aversion in v(w | r), this induces a stron-
ger response of the police on the loss side (w 
below r) than on the gain side (w above r).
2.2.9 Summary 
Reference-dependent preferences help 
explain (1) excessive aversion to small risks 
in the laboratory; (2) endowment effect for 
inexperienced traders; (3) the reluctance 
to sell houses at a loss; (4) equity premium 
puzzle in asset returns; (5) (possibly) the ten-
dency to sell “winners” rather than “losers” 
in financial markets; (6) (some evidence of) 
target earnings in labor supply decisions; (7) 
the tendency to insure against small risks; 
and (8) effort in the employment relation-
ship. I have discussed cases in which the 
evidence is more controversial (labor supply 
and endowment effect) and cases in which it 
is unclear whether reference-dependence is 
an  explanation for the phenomenon (dispo-
sition effect). I have also discussed how the 
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original model in Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) (and the calibrated version in Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992) is rarely applied in its 
entirety, often appealing just to reference 
dependence and loss-aversion.
A key issue in this literature is the deter-
mination of the reference point r. Often, 
 different assumptions about the reference 
point are plausible, which makes the applica-
tion of the theory difficult. Köszegi and Rabin 
(2006) have proposed a solution. They suggest 
that the reference point be modeled as the 
(stochastic) rational-expectations equilibrium 
of the transaction. In any given situation, this 
model makes a prediction for the reference 
point, without the need for additional param-
eters (though there can often be multiple equi-
libria, and hence multiple possible reference 
points). This theory also provides a plausible 
explanation for some of the puzzles in this 
literature. For example, as I discussed above, 
it predicts the absence of endowment effect 
among experienced traders (List 2003), even 
if these traders are loss averse. Experienced 
traders expect to trade any item they receive 
and, hence, their reference point is unaffected 
by the initial allocation of objects.
2.3 Social Preferences
The standard model, in its starkest form 
as in (1), assumes purely self-interested con-
sumers, that is, utility U(xi | s) depends only 
on own payoff xi.
2.3.1 Laboratory Experiments 
A large number of laboratory experiments 
calls into question the assumption of pure self-
interest. I present here the results of two clas-
sical experiments, which I relate to the field 
evidence below. (1) Dictator game. In this 
experiment (Robert Forsythe et al. 1994), a 
subject (the dictator) has an endowment of $10 
and chooses how much of the $10 to transfer to 
an anonymous partner. While the standard the-
ory of self-interested consumers predicts that 
the dictator would keep the whole endowment, 
Forsythe et al. (1994) find that sixty percent 
of subjects transfer a positive amount. (2) 
Gift Exchange games. This experiment (Fehr, 
Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl 1993) is 
designed to mirror a labor market. It tests effi-
ciency wages models according to which the 
workers reciprocate a generous wage by work-
ing harder (Akerlof 1982). The first subject (the 
firm) decides a wage w ∈ {0, 5, 10, …}. After 
observing w, the second subject (the worker) 
responds by choosing an effort level e ∈ [.1, 1]. 
The firm payoff is (126 − w)e and the worker 
payoff is w − 26 − c(e), with c(e) increas-
ing and slightly convex. The standard theory 
predicts that the worker, no matter what the 
firm chooses, exerts the minimal effort and 
that, in response, the firm offers the lowest 
wage that satisfies the participation constraint 
for the workers (w = 30). Fehr, Kirchsteiger, 
and Riedl (1993) instead find that the work-
ers respond to a higher wage w by providing 
a higher effort e. The firms, anticipating this, 
offer a wage above the market-clearing one 
(the average w is 72). These results have been 
widely replicated and have given rise to a rich 
literature on social preferences in the labo-
ratory, summarized in Charness and Rabin 
(2002) and Fehr and Gächter (2000).
2.3.2 Model 
Several models have been proposed to 
rationalize the behavior in these experiments. 
I introduce a simplified version of the social 
preference model in Charness and Rabin 
(2002), which builds on the  formulation of 
Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999).23 In a 
23 In these models, players care about the inequality 
of outcome but not about the intentions of the players 
(although the general model in Charness and Rabin 2002 
allows for the role of intentions). Another class of mod-
els (including Rabin 1993 and Martin Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 2004), based on psychological games, instead 
assumes that subjects care about the intentions that lead 
to specific outcomes. A common concept is reciprocity—
subjects are nice to subjects that are helpful to them but 
not to subjects that take advantage of them. These models 
also explain the laboratory findings.
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two-player experiment, the utility of subject 
1 is defined as a function of their own payoff 
(x1) and other-player’s payoff (x2):
(7) U1(x1, x2) ≡ {   ρx2 + (1 − ρ) x1, when x1 ≥ x2;    σx2 + (1 − σ) x1, when x1 < x2  .
The standard model is a special case for 
ρ = σ = 0. The case of baseline altruism 
is ρ > 0 and σ > 0, that is, player 1 cares 
positively about player 2, whether 1 is ahead 
or not. In addition, Charness and Rabin 
(2002) assume ρ > σ, that is, player 1 cares 
more about player 2 when 1 is ahead. Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) propose an equivalent 
representation of preferences24 and assume 
0 < ρ < 1, like Charness and Rabin (2002), 
but also σ < −ρ < 0. When player 1 is 
behind, therefore, she prefers to lower the 
payoff of player 2 (since she is inequality 
averse). These two models can explain giving 
in a Dictator Game with a $10 endowment. 
The utility of giving $5 is higher than the 
utility of giving $0 if 5 ≥ max ((1 − ρ) 10, σ10), 
that is, if ρ ≥ .5 ≥ σ (altruism is high enough, 
but not so high that a player would transfer 
all the surplus to the opponent.) Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) show that model (7) can also 
rationalize the average behavior in the Gift 
Exchange game for high enough ρ: altruistic 
workers provide effort to lower the inequal-
ity with the firm; the firm, anticipating this, 
raises w. 
2.3.3 Charitable Giving 
The size of charitable giving is sugges-
tive of social preferences in the field. In the 
United States, 240.9 billion dollars were 
donated to charities in 2002, representing an 
approximate 2 percent share of GDP (James 
Andreoni 2006). Donations of time in the 
24 Fehr–Schmidt preferences take the form: U1(π1, π2) = π1 − α min (π2 − π1, 0) − β min (π1 − π2, 0); they are 
equivalent to the preferences in (7) for β = ρ and α = −σ.
form of volunteer work were also substan-
tial: 44 percent of respondents to a survey 
reported giving time to a charitable organiza-
tion in the prior year, with volunteers averag-
ing about fifteen hours per month (Andreoni 
2006). Altogether, a substantial share of GDP 
reflects a concern for others, a finding quali-
tatively consistent with the experimental 
findings. However, while social  preferences 
are a leading interpretation for giving, chari-
table donations may also be motivated by 
other factors, such as desire for status and 
social pressure by the fund-raisers.
Even if we take it for granted that giving is 
an expression of social preferences, it is diffi-
cult to use models such as (7) to explain quan-
titatively the patterns of giving in the field for 
three reasons. (1) These models are designed 
to capture the interaction of two players, or 
at most a small number of players. Charitable 
giving instead involves a large number of 
potential recipients, from local schools in 
Oakland, CA, to NGOs in Africa. (2) The 
utility representation (7) implicitly assumes 
that x1 and x2 include only the experimental 
payoffs from, say, the dictator game. In the 
field, it is difficult to determine to what extent 
x1 and x2 should include, for example, the 
disposable income. (3) In one-to-one fund-
raising situations (hence side-stepping issue 
1), models such as (7) overpredict giving. 
Suppose, for example, that x1 = $1,000 is the 
disposable income of person 1 and x2 = $0 is 
the disposable income of person 2, for exam-
ple, a homeless person. For ρ ≥ .5 ≥ σ, the 
model predicts that person 1 should trans-
fer ($1000 − $0)/2 = $500, a level of giving 
much higher than 2 percent of GDP. One has 
to make ad-hoc assumptions on x1 to repro-
duce the observed level of giving. For these 
reasons, while models of social preferences 
are very useful to understand behavior in the 
laboratory, they are less directly applicable 
to the field, compared to models of self-con-
trol and of reference-dependence. Andreoni 
(2006) overviews models that  better predict 
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patterns of giving, such as models of warm 
glow.
There are, however, field settings that 
resemble more closely the laboratory set-
up. When a fund-raiser contacts a person 
directly, the situation resembles a dicta-
tor game, except for the lack of anonymity. 
Field experiments in fund-raising, including 
List and David Lucking-Reiley (2002) and 
Craig E. Landry et al. (2006), estimate the 
effect on giving of variables such as the seed 
money (the funds raised early on), the use 
of a lottery, and the identity of the solicitor. 
Charitable giving is increasing in the seed 
money (List and Lucking-Reiley 2002) pre-
sumably because of signaling of quality of the 
charity, and in the attractiveness of female 
solicitors for door-to-door fund-raising, espe-
cially for male respondents (Landry et al. 
2006). The latter result implies that giving 
in door-to-door fund-raising is not purely the 
result of altruism, suggesting a more instru-
mental view of giving. Overall, these field 
experiments do not answer the key question 
of what motivates most giving, genuine social 
preferences or more instrumental reasons, 
such as social pressure.
DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2009) 
provide direct evidence on this question in 
a door-to-door field experiment designed 
to distinguish altruism from social pres-
sure. If giving is due to altruism (including 
warm glow as in Andreoni 2006), the donors 
derive positive utility from giving. If, instead, 
giving is due to social pressure, the donors 
derive negative utility from giving (but still 
prefer to give rather than incurring the dis-
utility cost of saying no). Hence, potential 
donors will seek fund-raisers if giving is due 
to altruism, but will avoid them if giving is 
due to social pressure. DellaVigna, List, and 
Malmendier (2009) test this prediction com-
paring a standard door-to-door fund-raising 
campaign (the control group) to a fund-rais-
ing campaign where, the day before a fund-
raising visit, a flyer on the doorknob notifies 
the households of the time of the upcoming 
visit. The households in the flyer treatment 
respond in a direction consistent with social 
pressure: compared to the control group, the 
share of the households opening the door to 
the solicitors is 10 to 25 percent lower. The 
authors then consider the effect on giving. 
There is no effect of a simple flyer on the 
unconditional share of households that give, 
but a flyer with a “Do Not Disturb” box low-
ers the share of households giving by 25 per-
cent. The decrease is entirely due to small 
donations (up to $10), the ones most likely to 
be due to social pressure. The share of larger 
donations (higher than $10) is unaffected by 
either flyer. The results imply a clear role of 
social pressure in door-to-door charitable 
giving, but also provides indirect evidence of 
altruism for a subset of donors.
2.3.4 Workplace Relations 
Workplace relations between employees 
and employer can be upset at the time of 
contract renewal, and workers may respond 
by sabotaging production. Alan B. Krueger 
and Mas (2004) examine the impact of a 
three-year period of labor unrest at a union-
ized Bridgestone–Firestone plant on the 
quality of the tires produced at the plant. 
The workers went on strike in July 1994 and 
were replaced by replacement workers. The 
union workers were gradually reintegrated in 
the plant in May 1995 after the union, run-
ning out of funds, accepted the demands of 
the company. An agreement was not reached 
until December 1996. Krueger and Mas 
(2004) finds that the tires produced in this 
plant in the 1994–96 years were ten times 
more likely to be defective. The increase in 
defects does not appear due to lower quality 
of the replacement workers. The number of 
defects is higher in the months preceding the 
strike (early 1994) and in the period in which 
the union workers and the replacement work-
ers work side-by-side (end of 1995 and 1996). 
While a bargaining interpretation cannot 
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be ruled out, this provides some evidence 
that negative reciprocity in response to what 
workers perceive as unfair treatment can 
have a large impact on worker productivity.
Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and 
Imran Rasul (2005) test for the impact of 
social preferences in the workplace among 
employees. They use personnel data from a 
fruit farm in the United Kingdom and mea-
sure changes in the productivity as a func-
tion of changes in the compensation scheme. 
In the first eight weeks of the 2002 picking 
season, the fruit pickers were compensated 
on a relative performance scheme in which 
the per-fruit piece rate is decreasing in the 
average productivity. In this system, workers 
that care about others have an incentive to 
keep the productivity low, given that effort 
is costly. In the next eight weeks, the com-
pensation scheme switched to a flat piece 
rate per fruit. The switch was announced 
on the day the change took place. Bandiera, 
Barankay, and Rasul (2005) find that, after 
the change to piece rate, the productivity of 
each worker increases by 51.5 percent; the 
estimate holds after controlling for worker 
fixed effects and is higher for workers with 
a larger network of friends. The result is not 
due to a change in incentives: the flat piece 
rate is on average lower than the relative-pay 
piece rate, which would contribute to lower-
ing, rather than increasing, productivity after 
the switch. These results can be evidence for 
altruism; they can, however, also be evidence 
of collusion in a repeated game, especially 
since in the field each worker can monitor 
the productivity of the other workers. To test 
for these explanations, the authors examine 
the effect of the change in compensation for 
growers of a different fruit where the height 
of the plant makes monitoring among work-
ers difficult. For this other fruit, the authors 
find no impact on productivity of the switch 
to piece rate. This implies that the findings 
are not due to altruism, but rather to  collusion 
or to a different form of social  preferences, 
 reciprocity. According to this latter interpre-
tation, the lack of observability of the behav-
ior of others inhibits not only collusion, but 
also reciprocal behavior.
2.3.5 Gift Exchange in the Field 
The Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) 
paper underscores the importance of con-
trolling for repeated game effects in tests of 
social preferences. I now consider field exper-
iments that test for Gift Exchange control-
ling for these effects. Field experiments (like 
laboratory experiments) give the researcher 
more control over the design of an economic 
situation. Armin Falk (forthcoming) exam-
ines the importance of gifts in fund-raising. 
The context is the mailing of 9,846 solicita-
tion letters in Switzerland to raise money 
for schools in Bangladesh. One third of the 
recipients receives a postcard designed by the 
students of the school, another third receives 
four such postcards, and the remaining third 
receives no postcards. The three mailings are 
otherwise identical, except for the mention 
of the postcard as a gift in the two treatment 
conditions. The donations are increasing in 
the size of the gifts. Compared to the 12.2 
percent frequency of donation in the control 
group, the frequency is 14.4 percent in the 
small gift and 20.6 percent in the large-gift 
treatment. Conditional on a donation, the 
average amount donated is slightly smaller 
in the large-gift treatment, but this effect is 
small relative to the effect on the frequency 
of donors. The large treatment effects do not 
appear to affect the donations at next year’s 
solicitation letter, when no gift is sent. A gift, 
therefore, appears to trigger substantial posi-
tive reciprocity, as in the laboratory version 
of the Gift Exchange.
Uri Gneezy and List (2006) test the gift 
exchange with two field experiments in 
workplace settings. In the first experiment, 
they hire nineteen workers for a six-hour data 
entry task at a wage of $12 per hour; in the 
second experiment, they hire twenty-three 
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workers to do door-to-door fund-raising for 
one weekend at a wage of $10 per hour. In 
both cases, they divide the workers into a 
control and a treatment group. The control 
group is paid as promised, while the treat-
ment group is told after recruitment that the 
pay for the task was increased to $20 per hour. 
The authors test whether the treatment group 
exerts more effort than the control group, as 
predicted by the gift exchange hypothesis, or 
the same effort, as predicted by the standard 
model. The findings are two-fold. At first, the 
treatment group exerts substantially more 
effort, consistent with gift exchange: treated 
workers log 20 percent more books in the first 
hour and raise 80 percent more money in the 
morning hours. The difference however is 
short-lived: the performances of control and 
treatment group are indistinguishable after 
two hours of data entry and after three hours 
of fund-raising. In these two applications, the 
increase in wage does not pay for itself. These 
experiments suggest that the gift exchange 
may have an emotional component that dis-
sipates over time.
Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal, 
and Clemens Puppe (2008b) use a simi-
lar design for a six-hour library work in 
Germany, with an additional negative gift 
exchange treatment. This group of subjects, 
upon showing up, is notified that the pay 
is €10 per hour, compared to the promised 
pay of “presumably” €15 per hour. No one 
decides to quit. This group logs 25 percent 
fewer books compared to the control group, 
a difference that, unlike in the Gneezy and 
List (2006) paper, does not decline over 
time. The group in the positive gift exchange 
treatment (paid €20) logs 5 percent more 
books, an increase which also does not dis-
sipate over time. As in the laboratory find-
ings, negative reciprocity is stronger than 
positive reciprocity.
List (2006) presents evidence that not 
everyone reciprocates a generous transfer. 
Attendees of a sports card fair participate 
in a field experiment involving buying a 
card from a dealer. One group is instructed 
to offer $20 for a card of good quality (PSA 
grade 9), while another group is instructed to 
offer $65 for a card of top quality (PSA grade 
10). The quality of the card can be verified by 
an expert but is not apparent on inspection. 
Dealers that are “nonlocal” (and hence are 
not concerned with reputation) offer cards of 
the same average quality to the two groups, 
displaying no gift-exchange behavior.25 These 
dealers, however, display gift-exchange-type 
behavior in laboratory experiments designed 
to mirror the Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 
(1993) experiment. These findings raise 
interesting questions on when gift-exchange 
behavior does and does not arise. One expla-
nation of the findings is that bargaining in 
a market setting is construed as a situation 
where norms of gift exchange do not apply, 
possibly because a transfer of $60 is not con-
sidered a “gift.” Hence, the dealers do not 
display such norms when selling cards, but 
they do instead when  participating in an 
 experiment where the presence of a gift is 
clearer. More broadly, this suggests that we 
need to understand the economic settings 
in which gift-exchange norms apply (such 
as charitable giving and, to some extent, 
employment relationships) and the ones 
where they do not apply (such as market 
bargaining).
Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2008a) pro-
vide evidence on the importance of such 
norms. Within a field experiment along the 
lines of Gneezy and List (2006) and Kube, 
Maréchal, and Puppe (2008b), workers 
are hired to catalog books for three hours. 
Relative to a control group of seventeen 
workers hired for the announced hourly 
wage of €12, two treatment groups receive 
an unexpected gift: the first group of  sixteen 
25 Dealers that are “local,” that is, that attend the fair 
frequently, offer higher-quality card to the $65 group, pre-
sumably because of reputation building.
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students receives a €7 (20 percent) wage 
increase, while the second group of fifteen 
students receives a thermos bottle worth 
€7. This design is motivated by evidence on 
gift perceptions: subjects in an online sur-
vey presented with the experimental design 
perceive the employer as kinder when 
the gift is a thermos compared to money. 
The worker effort is consistent with gift 
exchange. Compared to the control group, 
productivity is 30 percent higher in the 
thermos group but only 6 percent higher 
in the money group. Interestingly, in the 
thermos group the relative increase in pro-
ductivity is larger than the increase in labor 
costs, suggesting that, unlike in Gneezy and 
List (2006), gifts can pay for themselves 
(although, since the market value of the task 
to the library is not clear, one cannot say for 
sure). The gift exchange response does not 
simply depend on the perceived economic 
value of the gift: in a separate experiment, 
172 subjects offered the choice of a €7 pay-
ment or the thermos overwhelmingly prefer 
the monetary payment. Future research 
will need to provide more evidence on the 
psychology of gift-giving, as well as models 
of it.
2.3.6 Summary 
Social preferences help explain (1) giving 
to charities; (2) the response of striking work-
ers to wage cuts; (3) the response of giving to 
gifts in fund-raisers; (4) the response of effort 
to unanticipated changes in pay, at least in 
the short run; and (5) the response of effort 
to nonmonetary gifts. However, the research 
on social preferences displays more imbal-
ance between laboratory and field, compared 
to the research on self-control and on refer-
ence dependence. The models of social pref-
erences that match the laboratory findings 
are not easily applicable to the field, over-
predicting, for example, the amount of giv-
ing. It will be important to see more papers 
linking the findings in the laboratory, which 
allows the most control on the design, to the 
evidence in the field; the recent literature 
on Gift Exchange is a good example. A sepa-
rate issue is the difficulty of distinguishing 
in the field social preferences from repeated 
game strategies (as in Bandiera, Barankay, 
and Rasul 2005) and other alternative expla-
nations. For example, social pressure (as in 
DellaVigna, Malmendier, and List 2009; see 
also section 4.4) can explain regularities in 
giving, such as the higher effectiveness of 
high-pressure fund-raising methods (such 
as phone calls) relative to low-pressure ones 
(such as mailings). Creative field experiments 
such as those in this Section can be designed 
to distinguish different explanations.
3. Nonstandard Beliefs
The standard model in (1) assumes that 
consumers are on average correct about the 
distribution of the states p (st ). Experiments 
suggest instead that consumers have system-
atically incorrect beliefs p˜       (st ) in at least three 
ways: (1) Overconfidence. Consumers over-
estimate their performance in tasks requir-
ing ability, including the precision of their 
information; (2) Law of Small Numbers. 
Consumers expect small samples to exhibit 
large-sample statistical properties; and (3) 
Projection Bias. Consumers project their 
current preferences onto future periods.
3.1 Overconfidence
Surveys and laboratory experiments pres-
ent evidence of overconfidence about ability. 
In Ola Svenson (1981), 93 percent of subjects 
rated their driving skill as above the median, 
compared to the other subjects in the experi-
ment.26 Most individuals underestimate the 
26 This finding admits alternative interpretations, such 
as that each individual may define driving ability in a self-
serving way. These interpretations, however, are addressed 
in the follow-up literature.
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probability of negative events such as hos-
pitalization (Neil D. Weinstein 1980) and 
the time needed to finish a project (Roger 
Buehler, Dale Griffin, and Michael Ross 
1994). In Camerer and Lovallo (1999), sub-
jects play multiple rounds of an entry game 
in which only the top c out of n entrants 
make positive profits. In the luck treatment, 
the top c subjects are determined by luck, 
while in the skill treatment the top c subjects 
are determined by ability in solving a puzzle. 
More subjects enter in the skill treatment 
than in the luck treatment, indicating that 
subjects overestimate their (relative) ability 
to solve puzzles.27
The first example of overconfidence in the 
field is the naiveté about future self-control 
by consumers in the choices of health club 
contracts, credit cards, and 401(k) plans, 
documented in section 2.1 (DellaVigna and 
Malmendier 2006; Ausubel 1999; Madrian 
and Shea 2001). Naiveté is an example of 
overconfidence since self-control is a desir-
able ability.
In a second example, Malmendier and 
Geoffrey Tate (2005, 2008) provide evidence 
on overconfidence by CEOs about their abil-
ity to manage a company. They assume that 
CEOs are likely to overestimate their ability 
to pick successful projects and to run com-
panies. As such, these top managers are 
likely to invest in too many projects and to 
27 A more recent literature including, among others, 
Justin Kruger (1999), suggests that, while overconfidence 
is typical for easy tasks such as driving, underconfidence 
can arise for hard tasks such as playing the piano, a dichot-
omy known as the “hard–easy effect.” As Kruger (1999) 
suggests, the subjects, when comparing their skills to the 
skills of others, do not appreciate that others similarly 
find these tasks respectively easy and hard. This results 
in overconfidence for easy tasks and underconfidence for 
hard task. A difficulty in applying the “hard–easy effect” to 
economics is the practical definition of a hard task. While 
running a company is arguably one of the hardest tasks 
one can imagine, it likely seems easy to a CEO that spends 
most of his or her time doing it. Sorting implies that eco-
nomic agents would mostly face tasks that they deem easy, 
making the underconfidence result less relevant.
 overpay for mergers. To test these hypothe-
ses, Malmendier and Tate identify a proxy for 
overconfidence, and examine the  correlation 
of this proxy with corporate behavior. In 
particular, they identify as overconfident 
CEOs who hold on to their stock options 
until expiration, despite the fact that most 
CEOs are heavily underdiversified. They 
interpret the lack of exercise as overestima-
tion of future performance of their company. 
In Malmendier and Tate (2008), they find 
that these CEOs are 55 percent more likely 
to undertake a merger, and particularly so if 
they can finance the deal with internal funds. 
(Overconfident CEOs are averse to seeking 
external financing, since they deem it over-
priced.) Of course, the correlation between 
option exercise and corporate behavior 
could be due to alternative reasons, such as 
insider information of the CEO. However, 
Malmendier and Tate show that insider 
information does not appear to be the expla-
nation, since the CEOs that delay exercising 
stock options do not on average gain money 
by doing so. Managerial overconfidence pro-
vides one explanation for the underperfor-
mance of companies undertaking mergers. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) use the same 
proxies to show that overconfidence explains 
in part the excess sensitivity of corporate 
investment to the availability of cash flows, a 
long-standing puzzle in corporate finance.
Overconfidence about own-company 
performance likely extends to rank-and-
file employees. Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, 
and Eric Zitzewitz (2008) study the predic-
tion markets that Google set up for its own 
employees (with real payoffs). While securi-
ties not related to Google are correctly priced 
on average, the securities with implications 
for Google display substantial overconfi-
dence: in two-outcome markets, the share 
that pays one dollar if the favorable outcome 
for Google occurs trades at 45.6 cents, while 
the average payoff is only 19.9 cents. While 
this evidence is specific to Google, survey 
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evidence suggests that this phenomenon is 
more general. Indeed, overconfidence of 
employees about own-company performance 
is a leading explanation for the provision of 
stock options to rank-and-file employees 
(Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer 2005; Nittai 
K. Bergman and Dirk Jenter 2007). Stock 
options have become a common form of com-
pensation: the (Black and Scholes) value of 
options granted yearly to employees in public 
companies was over $400 (about one percent 
of compensation) in 1999 (Oyer and Schaefer 
2005). Incentive effects are unlikely to 
explain the issuance, given that the contribu-
tion of each individual employee to firm value 
is very limited. Instead, overconfidence about 
own-company performance can make stock 
options an attractive compensation format for 
employers.28 This form of overconfidence is 
particularly plausible since the workers that 
are overconfident about a particular company 
are more likely to sort into it.
A third example of overconfidence is the 
tendency to overestimate the precision of 
own information, which is also a skill. For 
example, Marc Alpert and Howard Raiffa 
(1982) ask a group of 100 MBA students 
to provide answers for ten numeric queries 
such as “the number of foreign automobiles 
imported into the United States in 1967 in 
thousands” and “the total egg production in 
millions in the United States in 1965.” The 
students are also asked for 98 percent con-
fidence intervals. If the students estimated 
correctly the precision of their information, 
their confidence intervals should contain the 
correct answer in approximately 980 of the 
1,000 responses. Instead, the intervals con-
tain the correct answer in only 574 of the 
28 Bergman and Jenter (2007) point out that employees 
can also purchase shares on the open market, and hence 
do not need to rely on the company providing them. They 
examine the conditions under which the company will still 
offer options to overconfident employees, and provide evi-
dence that option compensation is used most intensively 
when employees are more likely to be overconfident.
1,000 cases! The elicitation of 75 percent 
 confidence intervals provides similar evi-
dence of overconfidence.
Odean (1999) provides field evidence 
consistent with this form of overconfidence 
using data from a discount broker on all the 
trades of 10,000 individual investors for the 
years 1987–93. If the investors overestimate 
the precision of their information about indi-
vidual companies, they will trade too much. 
Indeed, the investors trade on average 1.3 
times per year, with a commission cost for 
buying or for selling a security of over 2 per-
cent per transaction. In addition to these 
substantial transaction costs, the individual 
investors pay a return cost to trade since 
the stocks sold overperform the purchases 
by about 3 percent over the next year. For 
individual investors, therefore, overconfi-
dence has a substantial impact on returns. 
Interestingly, there is a gender differential in 
overtrading that is consistent with the psy-
chology findings, which suggests that men 
are more overconfident than women about 
financial decisions: men trade 45 percent 
more than women, and hence pay a larger 
returns cost. (Brad M. Barber and Odean 
2001).
Overconfidence about the precision of 
private information also helps explain other 
anomalies in financial markets, such as short-
term positive correlation of returns (momen-
tum) and long-term negative correlation 
(long-term reversal) (Kent Daniel, David 
Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam 
1998). To explain these phenomena, overcon-
fidence needs to be coupled with self-attribu-
tion bias, which is the tendency to discount 
information that is inconsistent with one’s 
priors. Overconfidence induces individuals 
to trade excessively in response to private 
information; in the long run, the public infor-
mation prevails and the valuation returns to 
fundamentals, inducing a long-term reversal. 
The self-attribution bias is responsible for 
momentum: in the short term, as investors 
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receive additional private information, they 
interpret as more informative the informa-
tion that conforms to their beliefs and, hence, 
become even more overconfident. I discuss 
how the law of small numbers and limited 
attention provide alternative explanations for 
these same financial markets anomalies in 
sections 3.2 and 4.2.
3.1.1 Summary 
Overconfidence helps explain (1) patterns 
in health club contract choice, credit card 
take-up, and default effects, presented in sec-
tion 2.1 (overconfidence about self-control); 
(2) value-destroying mergers and investment-
cash-flow sensitivity (overconfidence about 
managerial ability); (3) stock option compen-
sation packages for rank-and-file employees 
(overconfidence about own company perfor-
mance); and (4) excess trading, momentum, 
and long-term reversal (overconfidence about 
precision of information). These applications 
are settings in which overconfidence is par-
ticularly likely according to the laboratory 
evidence: overconfidence is more common 
when feedback is noisy (i.e., for stock returns) 
and the decisionmaker has an illusion of con-
trol (i.e., for managers).
3.2  Law of Small Numbers
Overconfidence is only one form of non-
Bayesian beliefs detected in experiments. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe a 
number of deviations from rational updating, 
including the overweighting of information 
that is available and representative. I focus 
on two phenomena—“gambler’s fallacy” and 
overinference—that are examples of reliance 
on the availability and representativeness 
heuristics. To illustrate these phenomena, 
I use Rabin (2002a)’s model of the law of 
small numbers. Rabin (2002a) assumes that 
subjects, observing a sequence of signals 
drawn from an i.i.d. process, believe (incor-
rectly) that the signals are drawn from an 
urn of size N < ∞ without replacement. 
If the  distribution of the signals is known, 
this induces a “gambler’s fallacy” belief: 
after a draw of a signal, subjects expect the 
next draw to be a different signal (since the 
draw is without replacement). For example, 
suppose that the return to a mutual fund is 
drawn from an urn with 10 balls, 5 Up and 5 
Down, with replacement. After two draws of 
Up, a rational investor expects the probability 
of another Up to be .5. However, a believer 
in the law of small number computes such 
probability as 3/8 < .5, since two balls “Up” 
have already been drawn. This is an example 
of the representativeness heuristics, in that 
the sequence “Up, Up, Down” is judged as 
more representative than the sequence “Up, 
Up, Up.”
Dek Terrell (1994) provides field evidence 
of the “gambler’s fallacy” in New Jersey’s 
pick-three-numbers game. The lottery is a 
pari-mutuel betting system: the fewer indi-
viduals bet on a number, the higher is the 
expected payout. Terrell (1994) finds that 
the payout for a number that won one or 
two weeks before is 33 percent higher than 
for an average number. Belief in “gambler’s 
fallacy” leads lottery players to bet less on 
numbers that won recently, at the cost of a 
lower expected payoff. This pattern is found 
in a number of other betting markets, includ-
ing the Maryland daily-numbers lottery 
(Charles T. Clotfelter and Philip J. Cook 
1993). It is likely to apply also to other situ-
ations in which the probabilities are known, 
but subjects misconstrue the i.i.d. nature of 
the draws. An example is the forecast of the 
gender of a third child following two boys 
(or two girls).
The model in Rabin (2002a) delivers a 
second testable prediction. In the case of 
uncertain distribution of signals, the subjects 
overinfer from a sequence of signals of one 
type that the next signal will be of the same 
type. While this overinference appears to 
be the opposite of the “gambler’s fallacy,” it 
is a complementary phenomenon. Consider 
345DellaVigna: Psychology and Economics
a mutual fund with a manager of uncertain 
ability. The return is drawn with replace-
ment from an urn with 10 balls. With prob-
ability .5 the fund is well managed (7 balls 
Up and 3 Down) and with probability .5 the 
fund is poorly managed (3 Up and 7 Down). 
After observing the sequence “Up, Up, 
Up,” a  rational investor computes the prob-
ability that the mutual fund is well- managed 
as P (Well | UUU) = .5P (UUU | Well) / [.5P 
(UUU | Well) + .5P(UUU | Poor)] = .73/(.73 
+ .33) ≈ .927. A Law-of-Small-Number 
investor also applies Bayes Rule but has 
the wrong model for P(UUU | Well) and 
P(UUU | Poor). Hence, her forecasted proba-
bility for P(Well | UUU) equals (7/10 × 6/9 × 
5/8)/[7/10 × 6/9 × 5/8) + (3/10 × 2/9 × 1/8)] 
≈ .972. Hence, this investor over infers about 
the ability of the mutual-fund manager after 
three good performances. Assume now that 
the Law-of-Small-Number investor believes 
that the urn is replenished after three peri-
ods. When forecasting the performance in 
the next period, the rational investor expects 
an Up performance with probability .927 × 
.7 + (1 − .927) × .3 ≈ .671, while the Law-
of-Small-Number investor expects Up with 
probability .972 × .7 + (1 − .972) × .3  ≈  .689, 
which is higher.
Benartzi (2001) provides field evidence 
of overinference (also called extrapolation): 
the degree to which employees invest in 
employer stock depends strongly on the past 
performance of the stock. In companies in 
the bottom quintile of performance in the 
past ten years, 10.4 percent of employee 
savings are allocated to employer stock, 
 compared to 39.7 percent for companies in 
the top quintile. This difference does not 
reflect information about future returns. 
Companies with a higher fraction of employ-
ees investing in employer stock underper-
form over the next year relative to companies 
with a lower fraction.
Barber, Odean, and Ning Zhu (forthcom-
ing) use data on individual trades to show 
that individual U.S. investors purchase 
stocks with high past returns, also consistent 
with overinference. The average stock that 
individual investors purchase outperformed 
the stock market in the previous three years 
by over 60 percent. (Interestingly, the aver-
age stock sold also outperformed the stock 
market, though by a smaller amount, con-
sistent with either a belief in “gambler’s fal-
lacy” or with the disposition effect (section 
2.2).)
Overinference in stock holdings can also 
induce predictability in asset returns. To 
the extent that investors overinfer from past 
performance, stocks with high past returns 
should get overpriced, and ultimately under-
perform. Werner F. M. De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) compare stocks that performed par-
ticularly well in the past three years (“win-
ners”) to stocks that did poorly in the past 
three years (“losers”). The “winners” under-
perform the “losers” by 25 percentage points 
over the next three years, again consistent 
with overinference.
Barberis, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny (1998) apply an alternative model of 
the law of small number to financial markets. 
While the draws are i.i.d., investors believe 
that the draws come from either a “mean-
reverting” regime or a “trending” regime; in 
addition, the investors believe that the first 
regime is more likely ex ante. If investors 
observe a sequence of identical signals, in 
the short run they expect a mean-reverting 
regime (the gambler’s fallacy); hence, the 
returns underreact to information, inducing 
short-term positive correlation ( momentum). 
However, after a longer sequence, the indi-
viduals overinfer, as in Rabin (2002a), and 
expect a “trending” regime; this induces a 
long-term negative correlation of returns. 
Hence, the law of small numbers can explain 
two key features of observed returns, short-
term positive correlation and long-term neg-
ative correlation (see also the discussion in 
section 3.1).
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3.3 Projection Bias
A third way in which individuals have 
systematically incorrect beliefs is that they 
expect their future preferences to be too 
close to the present ones; for example, they 
project current hunger levels on the future. 
Read and van Leeuwen (1998) asked office 
workers to choose a healthy snack or an 
unhealthy snack to be delivered a week later 
(in the late afternoon). Workers were asked 
either when they were plausibly hungry (in 
the late afternoon) or when satiated (after 
lunch). In the first group, 78 percent chose 
an unhealthy snack, compared to 42 percent 
in the second group.
Similarly, individuals underappreciate 
the extent to which they adapt to future cir-
cumstances. Daniel T. Gilbert et al. (1998) 
ask subjects to forecast their happiness in 
correspondence of an event, and compare 
these responses to the responses after the 
event has occurred. Thirty-three current 
assistant professors at the University of 
Texas forecast that getting tenure would 
significantly improve their happiness (5.9 
versus 3.4 on a 1–7 scale). However, the 
difference in rated happiness between 
forty-seven assistant professors that were 
awarded tenure by the same university and 
twenty that were denied tenure is smaller 
and not significant (5.2 versus 4.7). Similar 
results apply for happiness forecasts as a 
function of the election of a Democratic 
or Republican president, compared to the 
realized ex post differences. While these 
are just survey responses (below I provide 
evidence of impact on behavior), they sug-
gest a consistent pattern of projection of the 
current preferences.
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 
(2003) propose a simple model of projection 
bias. Assume that utility u is a function of 
consumption c and of a state variable s, that 
is, u = u(c, s). The current state is s′ and the 
future state is s. Then, when predicting the 
future utility  ˆ      u (c, s), an individual with pro-
jection bias expects utility 
(8)  ˆ      u (c, s) = (1 − α) u(c, s) + α u(c, s′)
rather than u(c, s). The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] 
captures the extent of projection bias, with 
α = 0 denoting the standard case and α = 1 
the case of full projection bias. This model 
can capture the misprediction of future 
hunger, as well as the underappreciation of 
adaptation.
Michael Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Tim- 
othy J. Vogelsang (2007) present evidence of 
projection bias using a data set of two million 
orders of cold-weather apparel items. They 
consider the effect of weather at the time of 
purchase on the probability that an item is 
returned, conditional on purchase. According 
to the standard model, colder weather at the 
time of purchase should not affect the prob-
ability of a return, or may affect it negatively 
(since colder weather at the time of purchase 
is correlated with colder weather over the 
subsequent days). Projection bias, instead, 
makes the opposite prediction. On colder 
days, individuals overestimate the use that 
they will make of a cold-weather item, and 
hence are ex post more likely to return the 
item.29 This prediction holds whether the 
projection bias regards future utility, as in 
(8) (“I expect to like cold-weather items very 
much”), or future weather (“I expect the 
coming winter to be very cold”).
Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang 
(2007) find that a reduction in the order-
date temperature of 30°F—corresponding 
to a decrease, for example, from 40°F to 
10°F—increases the average return rate 
of a cold-weather item by 3.96 percent, 
29 A possible confound is that on colder days more 
“marginal” individuals (which are more likely to return) 
order cold-weather clothing. The standard model modi-
fied for this form of heterogeneity makes the same predic-
tion as the projection bias model.
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consistent with projection bias. A simple 
structural model of projection bias as in (8) 
implies estimates for  ˆ      α ≈ 0.5, implying that 
consumers predict future tastes roughly half-
way between present tastes and actual future 
tastes.
4. Nonstandard Decision Making
Even given utility U(x | s) and belief p(s), 
individuals make nonstandard decisions. 
I analyze (1) the impact of framing of a 
decision; (2) the underweighting (or over-
weighting) of information because of lim-
ited attention; (3) suboptimal heuristics 
used for choices out of menu sets; (4) social 
pressure—explicit pressure by others—and 
persuasion—excess impact of the beliefs of 
others; and (5) emotions.
4.1 Framing
A key tenet of psychology is that the context 
and the framing of a situation matter. Two 
equivalent decision problems that are framed 
differently may elicit different responses. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) present a clas-
sical example, which I reproduce in the ver-
sion of Rabin and Weizsäcker (forthcoming). 
A group of subjects is asked to consider a pair 
of “concurrent decisions. [ . . . ] Decision 1. 
Choose between: A. a sure gain of £2.40 and 
B. a 25 percent chance to gain £10.00 and a 
75 percent chance to gain £0.00. Decision 
2. Choose between: C. a sure loss of £7.50 
and D. a 75 percent chance to lose £10.00 
and a 25 percent chance to lose £0.00.” Of 
53 participants playing this lottery for money, 
49 percent choose A over B and 68 percent 
choose D over C. Overall, 28 percent of the 
subjects choose the combination of A and D. 
This combined lottery, which amounts to a 
75 percent chance to lose £7.60 and a 25 
percent chance to gain £2.40, however, is 
dominated by the combined lottery of B and 
C, which reduces to a 75 percent chance to 
lose £7.50 and a 25 percent chance to gain 
£2.50. Over a quarter of the subjects, there-
fore, choose a dominated lottery when the 
choice is presented with a narrow framing, 
that is, with each lottery presented individu-
ally. A separate group of 45 subjects is pre-
sented the same choice in the broad framing, 
that is, they are shown the distribution of 
outcomes induced by the four options. In this 
group, not surprisingly, none of the subjects 
choose the A and D combination. Clearly, the 
framing of choices matters.
We can understand this first example of 
framing effects in light of a reference-depen-
dent utility function (section 2.2) with nar-
row framing. Individuals evaluate each of 
the two lotteries separately, comparing the 
outcomes relative to a reference point. The 
individuals are approximately risk neutral 
over gains, inducing the 49 percent choos-
ing A over B, and risk seeking over losses, 
hence the 68 percent choosing D over C.30 
Importantly, the individuals accept the fram-
ing induced by the experimenter and do not 
aggregate the lotteries, that is, they frame 
narrowly. This example illustrates a general 
feature of human decisions: judgments are 
comparative, and changes in the framing can 
affect a decision if they change the nature of 
the comparison, even if they do not affect the 
underlying economic trade-offs. While there 
is no field evidence directly corresponding 
to this framing manipulation, I discussed 
several applications to the field of reference-
dependent preferences in section 2.2.
A second example illustrates how the pre-
sentation format can affect preferences (in 
this case about financial options) even aside 
from its impact on reference points. Benartzi 
and Thaler (2002) survey 157 UCLA employ-
ees that participate in a 403(b) plan and ask 
them to rate three plans (labeled plans A, 
30 Other versions of this experiment (typically for hypo-
thetical stakes) indicate a higher percentage of subjects 
choosing A over B, consistent with risk aversion over gains, 
as in prospect theory.
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B, and C): their own portfolio, the average 
portfolio, and the median portfolio. For each 
portfolio, they present the 5th, 50th, and 
95th percentile of the projected retirement 
income from the portfolio (obtained using 
the Financial Engines retirement calcula-
tor). Given revealed preferences, one would 
expect individuals on average to prefer their 
own plan to the other plans. However, the 
own portfolio rating (3.07) is about the 
same as the average portfolio rating (3.05) 
and substantially lower than the median 
portfolio rating (3.86). Indeed, 62 percent 
of employees gave a higher rating to the 
median portfolio than to their own portfolio. 
Re-framing the decision in terms of ultimate 
outcomes, therefore, appears to affect pref-
erence substantially. However, an alternative 
interpretation is that these employees never 
considered the median portfolio in their 
retirement savings decision, and would have 
chosen it had it been offered. To address 
this explanation, Benartzi and Thaler (2002) 
survey 351 participants in a different retire-
ment plan who were explicitly offered a cus-
tomized portfolio and actively opted out of 
it. These employees rate their own portfolio, 
the average portfolio, and the customized 
portfolio, similarly reframed in terms of ulti-
mate income. A majority (61 percent) of the 
employees prefers the customized portfolio 
(which they previously turned down) to their 
own portfolio. The choice of retirement sav-
ings, hence, depends substantially on the for-
mat of the choices presented. This framing 
effect presumably reflects the fact that con-
sumers put too little weight on factors that 
 determine ultimate returns, such as fees, or 
that they do not appreciate the riskiness of 
their investments.
A third example is the case in which the 
framing focuses the attention on differ-
ent aspects of the options. Esther Duflo et 
al. (2006) estimate the impact of a match 
on IRA participation for low- and middle-
income households using a field  experiment. 
A random subsample of H&R Block cus-
tomers are offered either no match, a 20 
percent, or a 50 percent match on the first 
$1,000 contributed to an IRA. The take-up 
rate increases from 2.9 percent in the con-
trol group to 7.7 percent in the 20 percent 
match group and to 14.0 percent in the 50 
percent match group. The authors then com-
pare this substantial increase to the response 
to a comparable match induced by tax cred-
its in the Saver’s Tax Credit program. The 
effective match rate for IRA contributions 
decreases from 100 percent to 25 percent 
at the $30,000 household income thresh-
old. Duflo et al. (2006) compare the IRA 
participation for households slightly below 
the threshold ($27,500–$30,000) to house-
holds slightly above the threshold ($30,000–
$32,500). To control for other differences 
between these two income groups, they esti-
mate the difference-in-difference relative to 
households in the same income groups that 
are however ineligible for the program. The 
difference in match rate lowers contribu-
tions by only 1.3 percentage points, a much 
smaller impact relative to the effects in the 
H&R Block field experiment. While there 
are a number of differences between the 
programs, a prominent factor is likely to be 
the simplicity of the H&R Block match that 
garnered more attention to the match. The 
next section presents further evidence about 
the impact of limited attention on econom-
ics decisions. This example illustrates the 
importance of considering behavioral fac-
tors such as framing in the design of public 
policy programs.
4.2 Limited Attention
In the starkest form of the standard model, 
individuals make decisions using all the avail-
able information. Since Herbert A. Simon 
(1955), economists have attempted to relax 
this strong assumption and have proposed 
models in which individuals simplify complex 
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decisions, for example by processing only a 
subset of information.31 In economic experi-
ments, the simplifying heuristics include 
thinking only one step ahead in dynamic 
problems (Gabaix et al. 2006).
The laboratory studies in psychology indi-
cate that attention is a limited resource. In 
studies of dichotic listening (Donald E. 
Broadbent 1958), for example, subjects hear 
different messages in the right ear and in the 
left ear, and are instructed to attend to one 
of the messages. When asked about the other 
message, they remember very little of it. 
Moreover, in treatments in which they have 
to rehearse a sentence or a sequence of num-
bers while listening, their capacity to attend 
to a message is substantially lower.
I present here a simple model of atten-
tion as a scarce resource and derive testable 
implications. Consider a good whose value 
V (inclusive of price) is determined by the 
sum of two components, a visible component 
v and an opaque component o, V = v + o. 
Due to inattention, the consumer perceives 
the value to be  ˆ  
   
 V = v + (1 − θ) o, where θ 
denotes the degree of inattention, with θ = 
0 as the standard case of full attention. The 
interpretation of θ is that each individual sees 
the opaque information o, but then processes 
it only partially, to the degree θ.32 The inat-
tention parameter θ is itself a function of the 
salience s ∈ [0, 1] of o and of the number of 
competing stimuli N: θ = θ (s, N). Based on 
the psychology evidence, I assume that the 
inattention θ is decreasing in the salience s 
and increasing in the competing stimuli N: θ′s < 0 and θ′N > 0. Inattention is zero for a fully 
31 John Conlisk (1996) provides an early survey of this 
literature. I discuss the model of inattention by Gabaix 
and Laibson (2006) in section 5.
32 An alternative model (Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, 
and Kory Kroft forthcoming) posits that θ is the probabil-
ity that an individual perceives the opaque signal, rather 
than the degree to which each individual incorporates the 
signal. This alternative model leads to similar results but a 
more cumbersome solution for settings like an auction.
salient signal: θ (1, N) = 0. The consumer’s 
demand is D [ ˆ      V], with D′[x] > 0 for all x.
This model suggests, broadly speaking, 
three strategies to identify the inattention 
parameter θ, which the papers described 
below undertake. The first is to compute how 
the valuation  ˆ  
   
 V responds to a change in o; the 
derivative ∂ ˆ      V/∂o = (1 − θ) can be compared 
to ∂  ˆ      V/∂ v = 1 to test for limited attention. 
Tanjim Hossain and John Morgan (2006) and 
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (forthcoming) in 
the section on alcohol taxes follow this ave-
nue. The second is to examine the response 
of consumer valuation to an increase in the 
salience s, ∂ ˆ      V/∂s = − θ′s o, and test whether 
it differs from zero. This is the strategy of 
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (forthcoming) in 
their field experiment. The third strategy is 
to vary the number of competing stimuli N, 
∂ ˆ      V/∂N = − θ′N o, and test whether this has 
an effect. This is the strategy of DellaVigna 
and Joshua M. Pollet (forthcoming) and 
Hirshleifer, Sonya Seongyeon Lim, and Siew 
Hong Teoh (forthcoming). All three of these 
strategies identify a piece of opaque informa-
tion o with regards to which the decision-
makers are not fully attentive.
This research is subject to two cave-
ats. The first caveat is that measuring the 
salience of information involves a subjective 
judgment, similar to the judgment involved 
in setting the reference point in prospect 
theory. While in most settings (such as the 
ones in this section) it is rather clear which 
features are visible and which are opaque, 
the psychology experiments do not provide 
a general criterion. The second caveat is that 
we do not address whether the inattention is 
rational or not. In general, models of limited 
attention can be rephrased as rational model 
with information costs in which less salient 
information has higher costs of acquisition. 
In most of the examples below, however, the 
opaque information is publicly available at a 
zero or small cost (for example, the informa-
tion on earnings announcements), making 
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a rational interpretation of the findings less 
plausible.
4.2.1 Inattention to Shipping Costs 
In eBay auctions, the price of an item is 
more vivid than the shipping cost, because 
the shipping cost is not listed in the item 
title and also because historically most 
 purchases have not involved shipping. 
Define v as the value of the object and o as 
the negative of the shipping cost: o = −c. 
Since eBay is (essentially) a second price 
auction, the inattentive bidders bid their 
value net of the (perceived) shipping cost: 
b* = v − (1 − θ) c. The revenue raised by 
the seller is b* + c = v + θc. A $1 increase 
in the shipping cost c, therefore, increases 
revenue by θ dollars. In the case of full 
attention (θ = 0), increases in the shipping 
cost have no effect on revenue. Hossain and 
Morgan (2006) examine these predictions 
with a field experiment. In the treatment 
cLO , they auction CDs with a $4 reserve 
price and no shipping cost, while in treat-
ment c HI they auction CDs with a $.01 
reserve price and a $3.99 shipping cost. The 
change in reserve price guarantees that the 
two auctions are equivalent for a fully atten-
tive bidder. The average revenue raised in 
treatment c HI is $1.79 higher ($10.16 versus 
$8.37) than in treatment cLO , and is higher 
for nine out of ten CDs.33 These estimates 
imply substantial inattention:  ˆ  
  
 θ = 1.79/3.99 
= .45. A second set of auctions with higher 
shipping costs (cLO = $2 and c HI = $6), leads 
to smaller increase of revenue in the high-
shipping cost condition ($12.87 vs. $12.15), 
corresponding to an inattention param-
eter  ˆ  
  
 θ = 0.72/4 = .18.
4.2.2 Inattention to Nontransparent Taxes 
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (forthcoming) 
study whether consumers are inattentive to 
33 I exclude CDs that do not sell from this computation; 
the difference would be $2.60 if they were included.
taxes that are not transparently factored in 
the price of a good, like indirect state taxes. 
They use data on the demand for items in 
a grocery store. Assume that demand D is 
a function of the visible part of the value 
v, including the price p, and of the less vis-
ible part o, in this case the state tax −tp: D 
= D[v − (1 − θ) tp]. The change in log-
demand Δ log D from making the tax fully 
salient (s = 1 and hence θ = 0) is (linearizing 
the demand) log D [v − tp] − log D[v − (1 − 
θ) tp] = −θtp × D′ [v − (1 − θ) tp]/D[v − (1 
− θ) tp] = θt × ηD, p, where ηD, p is the price 
elasticity of demand. (Since demand D is a 
function of value minus price, ηD, p = −pD′ [v − (1 − θ) tp]/D[v − (1 − θ) tp].) Notice that 
the response is zero for fully attentive con-
sumers (θ = 0). This implies θ = Δ log D/(t 
× ηD, p ). Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (forth-
coming) manipulate the salience of taxes 
with a field experiment. In a three-week 
period, the price tags of certain items make 
salient the after-tax price, in addition to 
indicating the pretax price. Compared to 
previous-week sales for the same item, and 
compared to items for which tax was not 
made salient, the average quantity sold 
decreases (significantly) by 2.20 units rela-
tive to a baseline level of 25, an 8.8 per-
cent decline. Since the price elasticity ηD, p 
in this sample is estimated to be −1.59 
and the tax is 7.375 percent, we can com-
pute  ˆ  
  
 θ = (−.088)/(−1.59 × .07375) ≈ .75. 
In a separate estimation strategy, Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft (forthcoming) identify 
the impact on beer consumption of changes 
across States and over time in the excise and 
sales taxes. Since the excise tax is included 
in the price while the sales tax is added at 
the register, inattentive consumers should be 
more responsive to changes in the excise tax 
than to changes in the sales tax. Indeed, the 
first elasticity is substantially larger, leading 
to an estimate of the inattention parameter 
of  ˆ  
  
 θ = .94. Consumer inattention to non- 
transparent taxes is substantial.
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4.2.3  Inattention to Complex Information 
in Rankings 
In other settings, the familiarity of infor-
mation depends on the simplicity of the 
data format. Devin G. Pope (2007) stud-
ies the response of consumers to rankings 
of hospitals and colleges by the U.S. News 
and World Report. Each year, the company 
constructs a continuous quality score from 
0 to 100 largely based on reputation scores, 
and then creates rankings based on this 
score. Both the scores and the rankings are 
published in the yearly report. While the 
continuous score contains all the informa-
tion, the rankings are presumably easier to 
process (no. 5 hospital versus hospital with 
89/100 score). Pope shows that, holding con-
stant the quality score, hospital discharges 
respond significantly to differences in ranks 
among hospitals; similarly, college applica-
tions respond to differences in ranks among 
colleges. Pope (2007) also provides a calibra-
tion of the inattention or thinking costs nec-
essary to justify this result.
4.2.4 Inattention to Financial News 
Limited attention among investors induces 
underreaction to newly released informa-
tion and, hence, can explain anomalies such 
as momentum (Harrison Hong and Jeremy 
C. Stein 1999). Gur Huberman and Tomer 
Regev (2001) examine the case of the com-
pany EntreMed, an interesting example of 
underreaction to information. On November 
28, 1997, Nature prominently features an 
article reporting positive results on a cure 
for a type of cancer for a drug patented by 
EntreMed. On the same day, the New York 
Times reports an article on the same topic 
on page A28. Unsurprisingly, the stock price 
of EntreMed increases by 28 percent. What 
is surprising is what happens next. On May 
4, 1998, the New York Times publishes on 
the front page an article on EntreMed that is 
very similar to the article that it had already 
published in November. Despite the fact that 
the article contains no new hard informa-
tion, it leads to a 330 percent one-day return 
for EntreMed, and to a 7.5 percent one-day 
return for all bio-tech companies, moving 
billions in market capitalization. The stock 
price of EntreMed does not revert to the pre-
vious level over the whole next year.
While this is just a case study, it stresses 
the importance of studying systemati-
cally the response to new information. One 
important setting is the release of quarterly 
earnings news, and the consequent response 
of asset prices. To simplify, assume that v is 
the known information about cash flows of 
the company, and that o is the new informa-
tion contained in the earnings announce-
ment. On the day before the announcement, 
the company price is P = v. On the day of 
the announcement, the updated company 
value is v + o. However, since the investors 
are inattentive, the asset price P responds 
only partially to the new information: 
P = v + (1 − θ) o. Over time, as the informa-
tion makes its way to the inattentive investors 
(for example through additional articles as in 
the EntreMed case), the price incorporates 
the full value v + o. This implies that the 
short-run stock return rSR equals rSR = (1 − θ) o/v; the long-run stock return rLR, instead, 
equals rLR = o/v. In this example, a measure 
of investor attention is (∂ rSR/∂o)/(∂ rLR/∂o) = (1 − θ). (The division by (∂ rLR/∂o) is a 
 renormalization that makes the measure 
scale invariant) The higher is the inatten-
tion, the smaller is the immediate response 
and the larger is the predictability of stock 
returns in the days following the announce-
ment, a phenomenon known as postearnings 
announcement drift (Victor L. Bernard and 
Jacob K. Thomas 1989). Inattention leads to 
delayed absorption of information.
While this setting is highly stylized, similar 
results obtain after allowing for uncertainty 
and arbitrage, as long as arbitrage is limited 
by risk aversion and short investor horizons 
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(for example, DellaVigna and Pollet forth-
coming). DellaVigna and Pollet (forthcom-
ing) estimate the empirical counterpart of 
(∂ rSR/∂ o) / (∂ rLR/∂o) using the response of 
returns r to the earnings surprise o. They 
measure returns in the two days surround-
ing an announcement (rSR ) and over the 
seventy-five trading days from an announce-
ment (rLR ). The immediate response cap-
tures 54 percent of the overall response, 
implying substantial inattention:  ˆ  
  
 θ ≈ .46. If 
the delayed response is due to attention defi-
cits, the delay should be even stronger when 
a higher share of investors are distracted 
(higher θ). DellaVigna and Pollet (forthcom-
ing) use the weekend as a proxy of inves-
tor distraction. For announcements made 
on Friday, indeed, the share of immediate 
response (∂ rSR/∂ o)/(∂ rLR/∂ o) is 41 percent, 
implying  ˆ  
  
 θ ≈ .59, consistent with higher inat-
tention before the weekend. This provides an 
explanation for the observed release of worse 
earnings on Friday: companies maximizing 
short-term value release worse news on low-
attention days.
In a similar context, Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (forthcoming) analyze the impact of 
informational overload (high N in the frame-
work above). They find that the incorporation 
of earnings news into stock prices is 20 per-
cent slower on days in which more announce-
ments take place. Increasing the amount 
of competing information accentuates the 
effect of limited attention.
Another related study is Lauren Cohen 
and Andrea Frazzini (2008), which ana-
lyzes how investors respond to indirect, 
and hence less salient news (low s in the 
framework above). They consider compa-
nies linked in the supplier–customer chain. 
When a customer company announces 
 substantial earnings news, the news affects 
also the supplier, but this indirect effect is 
less likely to attract attention. Indeed, Cohen 
and Frazzini (2008) show that suppliers of 
companies which experience declining stock 
returns have lower stock returns one to three 
months later. They measure the speed of the 
response of returns to news about the cus-
tomer company using (∂ rSR/∂ o)/(∂ rLR/∂ o), 
where rSR is the one-month return and rLR is 
a seven-month return. They find that, for the 
customer company, 93 percent of the overall 
response occurs in the initial month; for the 
supplier company, instead, only 60 percent 
of the overall response occurs in the first 
month, suggesting substantial inattention to 
indirect links.
A final dimension of salience s is the tem-
poral distance. Holding constant the infor-
mativeness, information that is further into 
the future (or past) is less likely to be salient. 
In general, it is difficult to control for infor-
mativeness, since information that is further 
away is usually less relevant or less precisely 
estimated. DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) 
address this issue by considering future 
demand shifts due to demographics. Unlike 
other demand determinants, cohort size 
shifts are highly predictable even ten years 
into the future. For example, if a large cohort 
is born in 2006, school bus companies in 
2012 are going to experience a forecastable 
increase in demand and, if the market is not 
perfectly competitive, in profits. If investors 
are perfectly attentive, this increase will be 
incorporated into returns already in 2006 
and stock returns from 2006 to 2012 will not 
be predictable using demographic informa-
tion. However, if investors neglect informa-
tion beyond five years into the future, the 
stock prices will increase only in 2007, and 
stock returns from 2006 to 2012 will be pre-
dictable using public information on demo-
graphics. Using data for forty-eight industries 
from 1939 to 2003, DellaVigna and Pollet 
show that the growth rate in demand due to 
demographics five to ten years ahead fore-
casts stock returns in an industry positively. 
These results are consistent with inattention 
to information further than approximately 
five years into the future.
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4.2.5 Summary 
Limited attention helps explain the (par-
tial) neglect of (1) shipping costs in eBay auc-
tions; (2) nontransparent taxes; (3) complex 
information in rankings; (4) earnings news, 
especially before weekends and on days with 
more competing news; (5) news about linked 
companies; and (6) demand shifts in the dis-
tant future. As an example of application to 
another field, a literature on inattention in 
macroeconomics developed from the models 
of sticky information of N. Gregory Mankiw 
and Ricardo Reis (2002) and of rational inat-
tention of Christopher A. Sims (2003).
4.3 Menu Effects
In this section, I consider choices out of a 
(typically large) menu set, such as for invest-
ment options or politicians on a ballot. The 
evidence in psychology suggests that individ-
uals use (at least) five  suboptimal heuristics 
to simplify these decisions: (1) excess diver-
sification (or 1/n heuristic), (2) preference 
for the familiar, (3) preference for the salient, 
(4) choice avoidance, and (5) confusion in 
implementing the choices.
4.3.1 Excess Diversification 
Individuals facing a complex choice may 
simplify it by diversifying excessively across 
the options. An example in psychology is 
Itamar Simonson (1990). In a first treatment 
(simultaneous condition), students in a class 
chose snacks to be consumed over the next 
three class meetings, one per meeting. In a 
second treatment (sequential condition), the 
subjects chose the snack sequentially on each 
of the three class meetings. In the simulta-
neous condition, the subjects display excess 
diversification: 64 percent of subjects chose 
three different snacks, while in the sequen-
tial condition only 9 percent of subjects made 
this choice.
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) study whether 
excess diversification applies to 401(k) 
 investments. As a special case, they study 
the case of equal diversification across the 
n available options, the 1/n heuristics. They 
use aggregate data on the 1996 plan assets 
for 162 companies that offer an average of 6.8 
plan options. Lacking individual-level data, 
they study an aggregate implication of the 1/n 
heuristic. If individuals divide their invest-
ments approximately equally across options, 
their exposure to equity will be increasing in 
the availability of equity options in the 401(k) 
plan. Across plans, Benartzi and Thaler esti-
mate the relationship
(9) %Invested In Equity =  ˆ      α + .36(.04)
 × %Equity Options +  ˆ      BX
(s.e. in parentheses), where the control vari-
able X is the availability of employer stock in 
the portfolio. In companies with an equity 
share that is 10 percentage points higher, the 
employees invest 3.6 percent more in equity 
plans. This finding is consistent with a weak 
form of the 1/n heuristic (If the employees 
followed the 1/n heuristics strictly, the coef-
ficient should be 1 rather than .36). A con-
found is that the equity content of a plan may 
be designed to cater to the preferences of the 
employees, resulting in reverse causation.
Huberman and Wei Jiang (2006) investi-
gate the investor diversification using a data 
set on the individual choice of employees in 
647 401(k) plans managed by Vanguard. They 
estimate specification (9) at the individual 
level with a large set of individual-level and 
plan-level controls X. They obtain the rela-
tionship %Invested In Equity =  ˆ      α + .29 (.11) 
× %Equity Options +  ˆ      BX for funds with less 
than ten options and %Invested In Equity 
= α + .07 (.09) × %Equity Options +  ˆ      BX 
for funds with more than ten options. The 
relationship predicted by the 1/n heuristic, 
therefore, is present when the number of 
funds is small (as in the Benartzi and Thaler 
sample), but not when the number of funds is 
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large. Huberman and Jiang provide additional 
evidence suggesting that the predictive power 
of the 1/n heuristic is low. In particular, the 
number of funds chosen by employees hardly 
responds at all to the number of investment 
options offered in the plan. (This test differs 
from the one above as it is not conditional on 
equity vs. nonequity choices.) There is some 
evidence of a conditional 1/n heuristic: con-
ditional on the allocations chosen, individuals 
allocate their savings approximately equally. 
Thirty-seven percent of employees follow this 
behavior among employees investing in four 
funds, 26 percent among employees investing 
in five funds, and 53 percent among employees 
investing in ten funds; the behavior is instead 
not common for nonround numbers. Overall, 
some employees use a version of the 1/n heu-
ristic when the number of investment options 
is small; when the number is large, other heu-
ristics, which I discuss next, are at play.
4.3.2 Preference for the Familiar 
A different heuristic to simplify complex 
decisions is the choice of a familiar option. 
This tendency is widespread among individ-
ual investors. Investors in the United States, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom allocate 94 
percent, 98 percent, and 82 percent of their 
equity investment, respectively, to domestic 
equities (Kenneth R. French and Poterba 
1991). While the preference for own-country 
equity may be due to costs of investments 
in foreign assets, the same pattern appears 
for within-country investment. Huberman 
(2001) documents the geographical distri-
bution of the shareholders of the Regional 
Bell companies. The fraction invested in 
the own-state Regional Bell is 82 percent 
higher than the fraction invested in the next 
Regional Bell company. The preference for 
the familiar occurs despite substantial costs 
of underdiversification.
A particularly egregious case is the pref-
erence for own-company stock. On aver-
age, employees invest 20–30 percent of 
their  discretionary funds in employer stocks 
(Benartzi 2001), despite the fact that the 
employees’ human capital is already invested 
in their company. This choice does not reflect 
private information about future perfor-
mance. Companies where a higher propor-
tion of employees invest in employer stock 
have lower subsequent one-year returns, 
compared to companies with a lower propor-
tion of employee investment.
The preference for familiar options is con-
sistent with ambiguity aversion. As in the 
classical Daniel Ellsberg (1961) paradox, 
investors that are ambiguity averse may pre-
fer an investment with known distribution of 
returns to an investment with unknown dis-
tribution, even if the average returns are the 
same for the two investments, and despite 
the benefits of diversification.
4.3.3 Preference for the Salient 
Barber and Odean (2008) show that indi-
vidual investors simplify complex portfolio 
decisions also by choosing a salient option. 
Using individual trading data, they show that 
individual investors are net buyers of compa-
nies with unusually high, or low, performance 
in the previous day, of companies with high 
trading volume, and of companies in the news. 
The effects are large: for companies in the 
highest or lowest decile of the previous day’s 
returns, the Buy–Sell imbalance (Buy−Sell/
(Buy+Sell)) for individual investors is 20 per-
centage points higher than for companies in 
the fifth decile. These results suggest that 
individuals solve the informational overload 
problem of which stocks to buy by picking 
companies that stand out. The same problem 
does not present itself for stock sales, since 
most investors own only a small number of 
stocks at any given time. This asymmetric 
pattern for stock purchases and sales could, 
however, also be due to short-sale constraint: 
individual investors would like to sell stocks 
that are “salient” but cannot do so due to the 
short-sale constraints. Consistent with the 
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inattention explanation, Barber and Odean 
(2008) show that the Buy–Sell imbalance 
patterns are similar for stock that the indi-
vidual investors already own and that, hence, 
they could easily sell.
The preference for the salient takes differ-
ent forms in different contexts. In the choice 
of candidates on a ballot, the first politician 
on the list stands out. A long-standing litera-
ture in political science, going back to Henry 
Bain and Donald S. Hecock (1957), exam-
ines the effect of the order of candidates on 
a ballot. Among the most convincing stud-
ies, Daniel E. Ho and Kosuke Imai (2008) 
provides evidence that the order matters 
even when it is randomly determined. They 
exploit the natural experiment induced by 
the California voting system that, since 1975, 
explicitly randomizes the ballot order of can-
didates across Assembly Districts. They show 
that in the 1998 and 2000 general elections 
a minor party candidate experiences on aver-
age a 10 percent increase in votes when first 
on the list. The effect is instead very small for 
candidates of the major parties, suggesting 
that irrelevant information is used as a tie-
breaker for cases in which the decisionmaker 
has less information. In primary elections, in 
which candidates are on average less known, 
the effect is stronger: the impact of being first 
in the list is on average a 20 percent increase, 
roughly 1.6 percent of the party vote.
4.3.4 Choice Avoidance 
The fourth heuristic used to deal with 
difficult decisions is perhaps the most sur-
prising: avoiding the choice altogether, pos-
sibly in favor of the default action. In a field 
experiment, Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark 
R. Lepper (2000) compare the behavior of 
 consumers in an upscale grocery store, 
where at some times consumers were offered 
the opportunity to taste six jams (the sim-
ple-choice treatment), while at other times 
the tasting included twenty-four jams (the 
 difficult-choice treatment). They find that, 
in the twenty-four-jam condition, more con-
sumers stop to sample jams (145 versus 104 
customers), but substantially fewer buy jams 
(four versus thirty-one customers). This find-
ing is surprising in light of the fact that in the 
standard model more choice can only lead to 
increased purchases. The explanation for this 
counterintuitive phenomenon is that when 
the choice is difficult, for example because 
the choice set is large, individuals find the 
decision stressful and look for ways to avoid 
the choice.
Marianne Bertrand et al. (forthcoming) 
examine the impact of a small or large menu 
set in the context of a field experiment on the 
mailing of 50,000 loan offers in South Africa. 
The authors randomize, among other things, 
the format of the table illustrating the use of 
the loan. The small-table format lists only one 
loan size as an example, while the big-table 
format presents four different loan sizes. The 
finding is consistent with the choice avoid-
ance results. The take-up in the small-table 
format is .6 percentage points larger com-
pared to a baseline of 8 percentage points, 
an effect size equivalent to a reduction of 
the (monthly) interest rate by 2.3 percentage 
points.
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2006) 
also provide evidence from a field experi-
ment that a smaller number of investment 
options increases participation in a 401(k) 
plan. Participation increases by 10 percent-
age points when nonparticipating employees 
receive a card that allows them, if mailed 
back, to enroll in a default plan (3 percent 
contribution in a balanced fund).34
34 The increase may be due to a reminder effect of the 
card. However, in other settings, reminders, and more 
generally financial education, do not have such large 
effects. For example, Carroll et al. (forthcoming) sent a 
survey including five questions on the benefits of employer 
match to 345 employees that were not taking advantage 
of the match. A control group of 344 employees received 
the same survey except for the five specific questions. The 
treatment had no significant effect on the savings rate.
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4.3.5 Confusion 
A final category of behavior, confusion, dif-
fers from the previous heuristics in that it does 
not reflect a preference, whether to avoid dif-
ficult choices or for salient options, but simply 
an error in the implementation of the prefer-
ences. As such, it differs from most behavioral 
phenomena that reflect a directional bias. A 
first setting is the choice of a political candi-
date among those in a ballot. Kelly Shue and 
Erzo F. P. Luttmer (forthcoming) consider 
California voters in the 2003 recall elec-
tions and exploit the random variation in the 
placement of candidates on the ballot, simi-
larly to Ho and Imai (2008). They find that 
the vote share of minor candidates is signifi-
cantly higher for candidates whose name on 
the ballot is adjacent to the name of a major 
candidate. While this phenomenon could be 
due to a spillover in attention, confusion is a 
more likely explanation: the effect of horizon-
tal adjacency (a name to the right or to the left 
of the major candidate) is almost entirely due 
to adjacency on the confusing side. For exam-
ple, in the sequence Bubble, Candidate A, 
Bubble, Schwarzenegger, Bubble, Candidate 
B, it is Candidate B that benefits from the 
presence of a major candidate, since some 
voters mistake its bubble for the bubble of 
Schwarzenegger. Candidate A does not ben-
efit, nor do candidates located at a diagonal 
adjacency. Further, the spillover of votes is 
larger for more confusing voting methods 
(such as punch cards) and for precincts with a 
larger share of lower-education demographics 
that are more likely to make errors when faced 
with a large number of options. This method 
allows for a measure of confusion. Across dif-
ferent voting methods, about 1 in 300 voters 
meaning to vote for a major candidate instead 
vote for a minor candidate. The phenomenon 
hence is small but not irrelevant. Importantly, 
it can have an aggregate effect, since confusion 
is likely to have a different prevalence among 
the voters of different major candidates.
Interestingly, Michael S. Rashes (2001) 
identifies a similar phenomenon in the trades 
of two companies, MCI and MCIC. The 
ticker for the MCI communication company 
is MCIC, while MCI is the ticker for a little-
known closed-end mutual fund, Massmutual 
Corporate Investors. Some investors attempt-
ing to trade shares of the larger communica-
tion company confuse tickers and trade the 
mutual fund company instead, resulting in 
a .56 correlation between the two trading 
volumes. This occurs despite the difference 
in fundamentals: the mutual fund company, 
for example, has only a .03 correlation in 
volume with the communication company 
AT&T. The mistrading causes a smaller, but 
still significant correlation of stock returns. 
Arbitrage moderates the impact of confusion 
on stock returns, but does not fully eliminate 
it. Using the correlation in volume and the 
average volume of trade for the two compa-
nies, one can compute the incidence of confu-
sion among MCIC investors: about 1 in 2,000 
trades are placed in error, a confusion rate 
smaller than the confusion rate displayed by 
California voters.35
4.3.6 Summary 
When choosing from a large menu of 
options, decisionmakers: (1) (to same extent) 
diversify excessively across the options; (2) 
choose familiar options, such as own-country 
or own-company stock; (3) choose salient 
options in investment choice or at the ballot; 
(4) avoid the choice and do not invest (or do 
not purchase); (5) display some confusion in 
implementing their choices.
35 Assume that the volume (number of trades) of MCI, 
VMCI,t, equals a constant α plus the shares traded due to 
confusion, s × VMCIC,t where s is the share of investors of 
MCIC that incorrectly trade MCI: VMCI,t = α + sVMCIC,t. 
Given a simple correlation coefficient between the daily 
volumes VMCI,t and VMCIC,t of .56, we can infer  ˆ 
  s = .56 × 
s.d. (VMCI,t)/s.d.(VMCIC,t) ≈ .56 × 10−3.
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4.4 Persuasion and Social Pressure
4.4.1 Persuasion 
In the standard model, individuals take 
into account the incentives of the informa-
tion provider. The neglect of these incentives 
can lead to excess impact of the beliefs of the 
information provider, which I label persua-
sion. An example from a laboratory experi-
ment is Daylian M. Cain, Loewenstein, and 
Don A. Moore (2005). The subjects are paid 
for the precision of the estimates of the num-
ber of coins in a jar. Since they see the jar 
only from a distance, they have to rely on the 
advice of a second group of subjects, the advi-
sors, that inspect the jar from up close. The 
two experimental treatments vary the incen-
tives for the advisors. In a first treatment, the 
advisors are paid for how closely the subjects 
guess the number of coins; in a second treat-
ment, the advisors are paid for how high the 
subjects’ guess is. Despite the fact that the 
incentives are common knowledge, the esti-
mate of the subjects is 28 percent higher in 
the second treatment. The subjects do not dis-
count enough for the conflict of incentives of 
the advisors.
In a financial setting, Malmendier and 
Devin Shanthikumar (2007) analyze how 
small and large investors respond to recom-
mendation by analysts. Analyst forecasts are 
notoriously biased upward—94.5 percent of 
recommendations are Hold, Buy, or Strong 
Buy—and affiliated analysts are even more 
biased. Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2007) show that large investors take into 
account this bias and discount the informa-
tion: for example, they respond to a Hold 
recommendation by selling the shares of a 
company, and they discount heavily positive 
recommendations by affiliated analysts. Small 
investors, instead, are subject to persuasion. 
They follow the recommendations literally—
for example holding a stock in response to a 
Hold recommendation—and do not discount 
for the additional distortions due to analyst 
affiliation.
In a political setting, DellaVigna and 
Ethan Kaplan (2007) tests whether the infor-
mation provided by a news source convinces 
on average its audience. They exploit the 
geographical variation in the introduction 
in the cable programming of the Fox News 
Channel, a more conservative channel rela-
tive to the preexisting news sources (CNN 
and the networks). They show that Fox News 
availability in the town cable programming 
in 2000 is largely idiosyncratic, conditional 
on a set of controls. Using the voting data for 
9,256 towns, they find that the vote share 
for Republicans in 2000 is half-a-percentage 
point higher in the towns offering Fox News. 
They estimate that Fox News convinced 5 
to 30 percent of the audience that was not 
already Republican, depending on the audi-
ence measure. The effect is of about the same 
size for the Presidential candidates and for 
the U.S. Senate candidates, which Fox News 
does not cover. This indicates that the effect 
of Fox News extends beyond the candidates 
covered to the general political beliefs of the 
voters. The impact of Fox News can be a 
temporary effect for Bayesian voters that are 
learning about the bias of Fox News or a per-
suasion effect for nonrational voters that do 
not take sufficiently into account the political 
orientation of Fox News.
4.4.2 Social Pressure 
A separate reason for excess impact of the 
beliefs of others is the pressure to conform, 
or social pressure (Akerlof 1991). Two clas-
sical laboratory experiments illustrating the 
power of social pressure are Solomon E. 
Asch (1951) and Stanley Milgram (1963). 
In one of the Asch (1951) experiments, the 
subjects are shown two large white cards 
with lines drawn on them: the first card has 
three lines of substantially differing length 
on them, while the second card has only one 
line. The subjects are asked which of the 
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lines in the second card is closest in length 
to the line in the first card. In a control treat-
ment, the subjects perform the task in isola-
tion and achieve 98 percent accuracy. In the 
high-social-pressure treatment, the subjects 
choose the line of comparable length after 
four to eight subjects (who, unbeknownst 
to them, are confederates) unanimously 
choose the wrong answer. On average, over 
a third of subjects give the wrong answer to 
avoid disagreeing with the unanimous judg-
ment of the other participants. While this 
result could be interpreted as social learn-
ing, the learning is unlikely to be about the 
length of the line, but possibly about the 
rules of the experiment. It should also be 
pointed out that the subjects were not paid 
for accuracy.
In the Milgram (1963) experiment, a group 
of subjects is told that their task is to monitor 
the learning of another subject (a confeder-
ate) and to inflict electric shocks on this sub-
ject when he makes an error. Encouraged by 
the experimenter, 62 percent of the subjects 
escalate the electric shocks up to a level of 
450 volts, despite hearing the subject scream 
in pain. This proneness to obedience comes as 
a surprise to the subjects themselves. When 
a different group of forty subjects is provided 
with a description of the experiment and 
asked to predict how far subjects would go 
in inflicting shocks, no one predicts that 450 
volts would be reached.
In the field, social pressure is hard to distin-
guish from rational diffusion of information. 
In some studies, however, the social pressure 
motive is evident. Luis Garicano, Ignacio 
Palacios-Huerta, and Canice Prendergast 
(2005) measure the length of extra time that 
referees assign at the end of a game of soc-
cer; in the extra time the teams can score 
goals. They find that referees on average 
give twice as much extra time (four minutes 
versus two minutes) when the extra time is 
bound to advantage the local team (one goal 
behind) than when it is bound to hurt it (one 
goal ahead). The effect is larger when stakes 
are higher (toward the end of the season) and 
when the social pressure is larger (larger atten-
dance at the game). Referees respond signifi-
cantly to pressure by the local public, despite 
official rules on what determines the length of 
extra time.
Some of the peer effect literature also 
points to the importance of social pressure. 
Falk and Andrea Ichino (2006) measure 
the effect of peer pressure on task perfor-
mance. High school students in Switzerland 
were recruited to perform a one-time job 
for a flat payment; they were instructed to 
stuff letters into envelopes for four hours. 
The control group of eight students did 
the task individually, while the treatment 
group of sixteen students worked in pairs 
(but each student was instructed to stuff 
the envelopes individually). Students in the 
treatment group stuffed significantly more 
envelopes (221 versus 190), and coordinated 
the effort within group: the within-pair 
standard deviation of output is significantly 
less than the (simulated) between-pairs 
standard deviation.
While the results of Falk and Ichino 
(2006) could also be due to social learning, 
Mas and Enrico Moretti (forthcoming) pre-
senting direct evidence of social pressure. 
They find that high-productivity cashiers in 
a supermarket chain increase the produc-
tivity of coworkers that are present in the 
same shift. The effect is not due to exchange 
of information, such as on a price tag. The 
positive peer effect occurs only when the 
more productive coworker is behind and 
therefore can observe the other worker’s 
productivity. The effect is quite large: a one 
percent increase in the average permanent 
productivity of the workers behind increases 
the productivity of the peer by .23 percent; 
the effect is even larger for coworkers that 
are working at a closer distance. There is 
no effect of a highly productive coworker in 
front. This suggests that the peer effect in 
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productivity is entirely due to the social pres-
sure induced when a worker feels observed 
by a high-productivity coworker.
4.5 Emotions
Some of the previous phenomena, such 
as self-control problems, social preferences 
in giving, and projection bias in food pur-
chase are likely mediated (at least partially) 
by emotional states, respectively tempta-
tion, empathy, and hunger. In section 2.3, for 
example, I discussed how the transient effect 
of a “gift” in the Gneezy–List (2006) field 
experiment points to the role of emotions in 
gift-exchange behavior. A large literature in 
psychology suggests that emotions play an 
important role in decision making, and that 
different emotions operate very  differently 
(Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). In this sec-
tion, I consider two examples of emotions, 
mood and arousal, for which field evidence 
is available.
In psychology studies, even minor mood 
manipulations have a substantial impact on 
behavior and emotions. For example, on sun-
nier days, subjects tip more at restaurants 
(Bruce Rind 1996) and express higher levels 
of overall happiness (Norbert Schwarz and 
Gerald L. Clore 1983). In the field, mood 
fluctuations induced by the weather affect 
stock returns, despite the fact that daily 
weather fluctuations are unlikely to affect 
fundamentals. Days with higher cloud cover 
in New York are associated with lower aggre-
gate U.S. stock returns (Edward M. Saunders 
1993). Hirshleifer and Tyler Shumway (2003) 
extend this analysis to twenty-six countries 
between 1982 and 1997 using the weather of 
the city where the stock market is located. 
They find a negative relationship between 
cloud cover (detrended from seasonal aver-
ages) and aggregate stock returns in eighteen 
of the twenty-six cities. Days with completely 
covered skies have daily stock returns .09 
percent lower than days with sunny skies, 
five percent of a standard deviation. After 
controlling for cloud cover, other weather 
variables such as rain and snow are unre-
lated to returns. If mood is the channel for 
these effects, other mood-altering events 
should have similar effects. Indeed, inter-
national soccer matches impact the daily 
stock returns for the losing country (Alex 
Edmans, Diego Garcia, and Oyvind Norli 
2007). Compared to a day with no match, a 
loss lowers daily returns (significantly) by .21 
percent. (Surprisingly, a win has essentially 
no effect). More important matches, such as 
World Cup elimination games, have larger 
effects. The effect does not appear to depend 
on whether the loss was expected or not. 
International matches in other sports have a 
consistent, though smaller, effect.
The effect of these mood-altering events 
on returns is likely due to (1) an impact on 
risk aversion or perception of volatility or (2) 
a projection of the mood to economic fun-
damentals. The evidence above does not 
allow us to distinguish these two effects. 
Mood induced by atmospheric factors can 
also induce subtler changes in behavior. Uri 
Simonsohn (forthcoming) examines the role 
of weather on the day of campus visit to a 
prestigious university. Students visiting on 
days with more cloud cover are significantly 
more likely to enroll. Simonsohn suggests 
that higher cloud cover induces the students 
to focus more on academic attributes versus 
social attributes of the school, a hypothesis 
supported by laboratory experiments.
A second set of laboratory experiments sug-
gests that emotional arousal has an important 
short-run effect on decisions. In one experi-
ment, subjects that are sexually aroused as 
part of the treatment report a substantially 
higher willingness to engage in behav-
ior that may lead to date rape (Ariely and 
Loewenstein 2006). In other experiments, 
subjects exposed to violent video clips are 
more likely to display more aggressive behav-
ior, such as aggressive play during a hockey 
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game, compared to a control group watching 
nonviolent clips (Wendy L. Josephson 1987). 
The short-run impact on violence is not due 
to imitation, since the violent movie did not 
involve sport scenes. Hence, this effect is 
likely due to arousal induced by exposure to 
movie violence.
Gordon Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) 
provide field evidence on this effect and 
estimate the short-run impact of exposure 
to media violence on violent crime. They 
exploit the time-series variation in movie 
violence at the box office and compare days 
in which the blockbuster movies are violent 
to days in which the blockbuster movies are 
nonviolent. They find that, on days in which 
exposure to media violence is higher, violent 
crime is lower. In particular, in the night 
following the exposure (midnight to 6AM), 
for every million people exposed to violent 
movies, violent crime is 2 percent lower. The 
results hold after controlling flexibly for sea-
sonality, weather, and are robust to placebo 
specifications.
What explains this result, apparently in 
contrast with the laboratory findings? The 
key factor is the difference in treatments. In 
the laboratory experiments, treatment and 
control groups are required to watch either 
a violent or nonviolent movie. Hence, the 
experiments capture the direct impact of 
movie violence, holding everything else con-
stant. In the natural experiment in the field, 
instead, consumers optimally choose between 
violent movies and their other favorite activ-
ity. Hence, the estimated impact in the field 
captures the net effect of exposure to the 
movies, compared to the impact of this alter-
native activity. The subpopulation attending 
violent movies would, on average, be doing 
an even more dangerous activity, such as 
drinking at a bar, if they were not attending 
the theater. The two different sets of results, 
therefore, can be reconciled. Exposure to 
movie violence can lower violent behavior 
relative to the foregone alternative activity 
(the field findings), even if it increases violent 
behavior relative to exposure to nonviolent 
movies (the laboratory findings). Indeed, 
one can use the field estimates to infer the 
direct effect of violent movies (as in the 
laboratory) if one can control for selection. 
After accounting for selection along observ-
able dimensions (age and gender), Dahl and 
DellaVigna (2009) provide some evidence 
that indeed the direct effect of violent mov-
ies is to induce more violent crime, like in the 
laboratory experiments.
This study suggests that one ought to be 
careful about directly comparing the results 
of laboratory and field studies (Levitt and 
List 2007). Results that appear at first con-
tradictory can be reconciled in light of differ-
ences in design. In this particular case, both 
the laboratory and the field estimates provide 
useful evaluations of policy-relevant param-
eters. The field results provide evidence on 
the short-run impact of a policy that restricts 
the amount of media violence available in 
the theaters. The laboratory evidence pro-
vides evidence on the ban of violent material 
embedded in nonviolent programming.
5. Market Response
In the previous sections, I have docu-
mented how consumers deviate from the 
standard model in their choices of credit 
cards, clothing items, eBay bidding strate-
gies, giving, health clubs, housing prices, 
insurance contracts, loans, and lotteries. I 
have discussed how workers make nonstan-
dard effort, labor supply, and retirement sav-
ings decisions. I have provided evidence of 
disposition effect, inattention, and overtrad-
ing among investors. Finally, I documented 
evidence of salience effects, persuasion, and 
confusion among voters.
This evidence is just the first step toward 
a better understanding of markets where 
agents display nonstandard preferences 
and beliefs. This evidence raises a natural 
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 question: how do markets and institutions 
respond to these nonstandard features? An 
important test for Psychology and Economics 
is whether it helps to understand markets 
and institutions, in addition to explaining 
individual behavior.
This section discusses how rational actors 
respond to the nonstandard features of other 
agents. Profit-maximizing firms respond 
to the nonstandard features of consumer 
behavior in their contract design and pric-
ing (Behavioral Industrial Organization). 
Employers tailor their employment con-
tracts to the nonstandard behavior of the 
employees (Behavioral Labor Economics). 
In response to the nonstandard behavior of 
investors, rational investors alter their trad-
ing strategies and firm managers alter the 
capital structure (Behavioral Finance and 
Behavioral Corporate Finance). Politicians 
change their behavior to respond to voter 
biases (Behavioral Political Economy). 
Finally, policymakers can use the findings 
in Psychology and Economics to inform the 
design of institutions and of policy (Behavioral 
Institutional Design).
Before I proceed, I discuss an important 
caveat. If consumers have nonstandard fea-
tures, why should one expect firms, employ-
ers, financial operators, and politicians to 
not have them? Experience is a key differ-
ence. Unlike individual consumers, firms 
can specialize, hire consultants, and obtain 
feedback from large data sets and capital 
markets. Firms are also subject to compe-
tition. Compared to consumers, therefore, 
firms are less likely to be affected by biases 
(except for principle–agent problems), and 
we expect them to be close to profit maxi-
mization. In addition, even when, despite 
the reasons above, firms still have nonstan-
dard features, they still have incentives to 
respond to the nonstandard features of con-
sumers. Similar arguments apply for employ-
ers, institutional investors, top managers, 
and politicians.
5.1 Behavioral Industrial Organization 
The interaction between consumers with 
biases and rational, profit-maximizing firms 
is the central theme of the growing  literature 
in behavioral industrial organization, sur-
veyed in Glenn Ellison (2006). While this 
literature is mostly theoretical, the papers 
surveyed here also make predictions about 
observed pricing.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) con-
sider the profit-maximizing pricing with 
(β,  ˆ      β, δ) consumers with self-control problems. 
A (monopolistic) firm sells a product which, 
as in section 2.1, has immediate payoff b1 and 
delayed payoff b2. The set-up covers invest-
ment goods such as exercise (b1 < 0 and b2 > 0) and leisure goods such as gambling (b1 > 0 and b2 < 0 ). The immediate payoff b1 
is stochastic with c.d.f. F. The firm produces 
the good at marginal cost c and sells it using a 
two-part tariff, with a lump-sum fee L and a 
unitary price p. DellaVigna and Malmendier 
(2004) show that the profit-maximizing price 
p* satisfies
(10) p* −   c = −(1 −  ˆ      β) δb2  f ( ˆ  
   
 βδb2 − p*)  __________
f (βδb2 − p*) 
 −   F( ˆ  
   
 βδb2 − p*) − F(βδb2 − p*)   _____________________
f (βδb2 − p*) .
For standard agents (β =  ˆ      β = 1), the two 
terms on the right-hand side of (10) are zero: 
the firm prices at marginal cost, p* = c, to 
align the incentives of the consumers. For 
sophisticated agents with self-control prob-
lems (β =  ˆ      β < 1), only the first term in (10) 
is non-zero: the firm prices investment goods 
below marginal cost (p* < c) and leisure 
goods above marginal cost (p* > c) to provide 
a commitment device—the pricing increases 
the consumption of investment goods and 
lowers the consumption of leisure goods. 
The deviation from marginal cost pricing, 
−(1 − β) δb2, is exactly the difference in how 
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much the current self and the future selves 
value the delayed payoff b2; hence, the firm 
offers a perfect commitment device. For 
fully naive agents with  self-control problems 
(β <  ˆ      β = 1), only the second term in (10) is 
non-zero: the firm again prices investment 
goods below marginal cost and leisure goods 
above marginal cost again, but for a differ-
ent reason—it takes advantage of consumer 
overestimation (underestimation) of the con- 
sumption of investment (leisure) goods. 
The deviation from marginal cost pricing is 
indeed a function of the misestimation of 
consumption F ( ˆ  
   
 βδb2 − p*) − F (βδb2 − p*). 
These results generalize to the case of perfect 
competition, since competition only alters 
the equilibrium fee L*. This theory rational-
izes the presence of contracts with no pay-
ment per visit in health clubs (b2 > 0), the 
presence of high interest rates but no annual 
fees for credit cards (b2 < 0), and cheap room 
rates and buffets for gamblers in Las Vegas 
(b2 < 0).
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (2006) general-
ize this analysis to allow for heterogeneity in 
naiveté and a more general form of time-incon-
sistency of preferences. They show that firms 
offer two types of contracts: perfect commit-
ment devices that cater to time-inconsistent 
agents that are sufficiently sophisticated, and 
contracts that take advantage of the consum-
ers that are sufficiently naive. Interestingly, 
the fully sophisticated agents do not exert any 
informational externality on the naive types. 
Thus, the provision of the perfect commit-
ment device does not reduce the gains that 
the monopolist can extract from naive types.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyze the 
pricing with boundedly rational consum-
ers that do not pay attention to hidden fea-
tures of products, that they call add-ons. In 
equilibrium, firms charge above-marginal 
cost prices for the add-ons. As in DellaVigna 
and Malmendier (2004), the firms respond 
to the misprediction of future purchases. 
This model provides an explanation for high 
( hidden) fees on bank accounts and credit 
cards. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) also dis-
cuss how markets do not generally provide 
incentives for debiasing naive consumers.
Paul Heidhues and Köszegi (2008) study 
the pricing of a monopolist when consumers 
have reference-dependent preferences and 
the reference point is the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium (Köszegi and Rabin 2006). 
Consumers are loss averse with respect to 
both lower quality and higher price, relative 
to the reference point. The main predictions 
are sticky prices (despite no menu costs) 
and sales, two common features of pricing. 
In equilibrium, even if costs are stochastic, 
firms adjust prices seldom in response to cost 
shifts because consumers suffer more from 
price increases than they benefit from price 
cuts. In addition, firms offer random sales 
because the expectation of sales increases 
the likelihood of purchases at high prices.
These papers point to a dichotomy in the 
welfare effects of the market response. If the 
agents have nonstandard preferences, such 
as self-control problems or loss aversion, but 
have rational expectations, the firms provide 
welfare-maximizing contracts. The contracts 
offer first-best commitment devices against 
the self-control problem (DellaVigna and 
Malmendier 2004; Eliaz and Spiegler 2006) 
or lower the probability of falling below 
the reference point (Heidhues and Köszegi 
2008). If, instead, the agents have nonrational 
expectations, such as about the self-control or 
about the inattention, the profit-maximizing 
contract is likely to magnify the bias. Firms 
take advantage of the wrong expectations 
in the consumption of the tempting good 
(DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004; Eliaz 
and Spiegler 2006) or of the add-on (Gabaix 
and Laibson 2006).
5.2 Behavioral Labor Economics 
Contracting within a firm is also consistent 
with this framework. Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1986) present suggestive  evidence 
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using a survey that workers display loss aver-
sion with respect to nominal wage losses, 
but not with respect to real wage losses. For 
example, 62 percent of respondents find 
unfair a wage cut of 7 percent in the pres-
ence of no inflation, but only 22 percent of 
respondents find unfair a 5 percent increase 
in salaries in presence of 12 percent inflation. 
Truman F. Bewley (1999) documents similar 
patterns in a series of interviews. In response 
to a dislike for nominal wage cuts, a profit-
maximizing employer should set wages such 
that nominal wage cuts would be rare. Card 
and Dean Hyslop (1997) provide evidence 
on this prediction using CPS data. They con-
sider the distribution of year-to-year changes 
in the nominal log wage, log wt − log wt−1. 
In the presence of aversion to nominal wage 
losses, we expect a discontinuity in the dis-
tribution at log wt − log wt−1 = 0. Rather 
than introducing small cuts in the nominal 
wages that may lower morale and produc-
tivity, the employer keeps wages constant 
(log wt − log wt−1 = 0), compensating possi-
bly by firing more workers. Card and Hyslop 
indeed show that a substantial fraction of the 
distribution of log wt − log wt−1 is missing 
for negative values, despite the presence of 
measurement error in the wage that tends to 
attenuate this finding. This is an example of 
a market response to a bias that is likely to 
maximize utility for the biased agents. The 
observed distribution of wages is such that 
the employees suffer only rarely the disutil-
ity of nominal wage cuts.
5.3 Behavioral Finance 
In asset markets, arbitrage in principle is 
likely to limit the importance of behavioral 
biases such as inattention and overconfi-
dence for price formation. If an irrational 
agent believes that a (fair) coin will land on 
tails sixty percent of the time, arbitrage by 
well-informed agents will keep the odds of 
tails around fifty percent. In actual financial 
markets, however, several factors limit the 
impact of arbitrage. J. Bradford DeLong et 
al. (1990) considers the case of a mispricing 
that is stochastic, persistent, and correlated 
by so-called noise traders. If arbitrageurs are 
risk averse and have a limited investment 
horizon, the noise traders affect the equilib-
rium price, despite arbitrage. If noise traders 
are, for example, bullish about dot-coms, they 
will bid the price of dot-com shares higher. 
The arbitrageurs do not know whether the 
mispricing will get even worse in the next 
period, and given their short horizons (they 
have to liquidate the shares next period) they 
cannot short the shares aggressively enough. 
DeLong et al. (1990) also shows that the 
noise traders are not driven out of the mar-
ket; under some conditions, in fact, they out-
perform the rational traders (since they take 
more risk).
The recent research in behavioral finance 
builds on the noise-trade models to cap-
ture the limits of arbitrage and, hence, 
the relevance of nonstandard behavior for 
asset prices. At the same time, this litera-
ture moved beyond these models in mak-
ing explicit the source of “noise trading.” In 
sections 3.1 and 4.2, for example, I discuss 
models of overconfidence and limited atten-
tion, which make specific predictions about 
the nonstandard behavior and, hence, the 
effect on returns. The evidence on this class 
of models is summarized in Shleifer (2000) 
and Barberis and Thaler (2003).
5.4 Behavioral Corporate Finance 
In corporate finance, the standard theory 
assumes that managers maximize company 
value subject to agency problems, given the 
demands of rational investors and credi-
tors. A recent theory, known as market tim-
ing, expands this framework and assumes 
that investors may have an irrationally high 
or low valuation of the company. The CEO 
rationally responds to the misvaluation 
through the equity issuance and merger 
decisions. CEOs provide additional shares 
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to investors and undertake mergers when 
the shares are most likely to be overpriced, 
lowering the welfare of the biased investors. 
Market timing can explain the systematic 
 underperformance of initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in the three to five years following the 
IPO (Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter 1995). 
According to this interpretation, managers of 
private companies go public when the shares 
of their companies are overpriced, hence the 
underperformance of IPOs. Malcolm Baker, 
Richard S. Ruback, and Jeffrey Wurgler 
(2007) reviews the evidence supporting this 
theory. This theory complements the stan-
dard theory that issuance decisions respond 
to investment opportunities.
5.5 Behavioral Political Economy 
Another setting in which we expect an 
asymmetry between rational and biased 
agents is politics. While politicians are expe-
rienced agents facing high-stake incentives 
and significant competition, voters make 
infrequent low-stake decisions—whether to 
vote and for whom. Therefore, we expect 
political settings to be well-described by the 
interaction of rational politicians and vot-
ers with nonstandard preferences, such as 
imperfect memory and limited attention.
Thomas Eisensee and David Stromberg 
(2007) provides an example of politicians 
responding to a bias of voters, inattention. 
They consider the decision by U.S. ambassa-
dors to release U.S. aid in the days following a 
natural disaster in the country. Ambassadors 
presumably are more likely to release aid if 
they, or the government, get credit for their 
generosity. To capture this phenomenon, 
Eisensee and Stromberg exploit variation 
in voter inattention due to the presence of 
major news items in the U.S. television eve-
ning news or due to a major sporting event 
like the Olympics. They find that the prob-
ability of USAID relief is 15 percent lower 
for disasters occurring on days with a two 
 standard deviation higher intensity of news in 
the U.S. media. Similarly, the probability of 
relief is 30 percent lower in the period of the 
Olympics. On days in which the American 
public is less likely to notice the U.S. generos-
ity, generous acts are less likely to take place. 
This is consistent with politician response to 
limited attention of voters.
5.6 Behavioral Institutional Design 
While firms, investors, managers, and politi-
cians may respond to biases by exploiting them, 
the response to biases need not be predatory. 
Societal rules and institutions can be designed 
to counteract the effect of consumer biases 
and improve the welfare of consumers. Thaler 
and Benartzi (2004)’s Save More Tomorrow 
(SMarT) plan is an example of one such insti-
tutional design for 401(k) savings. In a SMarT 
plan, the contribution rate is set to increase 
at each future wage increase up to a capped 
level. While savings increases are the default, 
employees can opt out of the plan at any time. 
This plan is an attractive commitment device 
to individuals with self-control problems since 
the default applies to future savings rates, 
rather than current ones. In addition, the plan 
is designed with an eye to individuals that are 
averse to nominal wage cuts (see above), since 
the increases in contribution rates occur at the 
time of pay increases.
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) provide evi-
dence on three implementations of this plan. 
In the earliest implementation, the plan is 
offered to 207 employees that accept to meet 
with a financial consultant but do not accept 
to increase the savings rate immediately, as 
recommended by the consultant. Of these 207 
individuals, 162 individuals accept the SMarT 
plan, indicating a widespread demand for com-
mitment. In this subset of 162 individuals, the 
contribution rate increases from 3.5 percent 
to 13.6 percent in just four years. This increase 
includes the thirty-two individuals who opted 
out of the plan by the fourth year. The early 
results from the other two  implementations of 
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the SMarT plan indicate that the take-up of 
the plan is lower if it is offered as an option via 
mail, as opposed to with an  in-person meet-
ing. The effects conditional on take-up are, 
however, similarly large.
A simple change in defaults, hence, can go 
a long way toward addressing undersaving. 
The large impact of the SMarT plan, which 
comes at very limited administrative cost, 
is particularly noticeable when compared 
to the limited impact of other policies to 
increase retirement savings such as financial 
education. Also, while this plan is designed 
to benefit individuals with self-control prob-
lems, it does not hurt individuals with time-
 consistent preferences since these individuals 
can switch at any time. The success of this 
plan, as well as the research on default effect 
in 401(k) savings, have motivated the bill on 
Automatic Savings and Pension Protection 
Act that Congress enacted in 2006. This law 
gives incentives to companies to adopt 401(k) 
plans with automatic enrollment and auto-
matic increases in savings.
While the evidence in Psychology and 
Economics can have important policy implica-
tions, such as in this case, other considerations 
limit the policy reach of this evidence. First, 
unlike in the Thaler and Benartzi (2004) case, 
welfare-enhancing policies can be imprac-
tical—for example, it is more difficult to use 
defaults to help people exercise more. Second, 
political economy considerations suggest cau-
tion in the implementation of policies (Edward 
L. Glaeser 2006). Nevertheless, behavioral 
phenomena should be taken into account 
alongside standard phenomena in the policy 
design. Future research will tell whether 
the 2006 Savings Act will remain an isolated 
application of Psychology and Economics to 
policy or will be the first of several.
6. Conclusion
In this survey, I have summarized the 
field evidence on three classes of  deviations 
from the standard model: nonstandard pref-
erences, nonstandard beliefs, and nonstan-
dard  decision making. I have discussed how 
rational agents in the market respond to 
these nonstandard features. As this survey 
documented, deviations from the standard 
model are not confined to laboratory deci-
sions. Most phenomena that are important in 
laboratory experiments also affect decisions 
in a variety of economic settings. Hence, I 
expect that economists will increasingly take 
behavioral phenomena into account in their 
analysis.
Why don’t market forces eliminate non-
standard behavior? While a full discussion 
of this objection is beyond the scope of this 
article, I address two related arguments, one 
on experience and another on aggregation. 
A first argument is that experience reduces 
nonstandard behavior. Indeed, experience 
appears to mitigate the endowment effect 
(List 2003, 2004). Palacios-Huerta and Oscar 
Volij (forthcoming) provide concordant evi-
dence on the effect of experience on the 
ability to perform backward induction. They 
consider the centipede game. Chess players, 
who have to routinely perform backward 
induction-type reasoning, come close in their 
play to the predictions of backward induc-
tion, in sharp contrast to college students.
However, it would be wrong to conclude, 
based on this evidence, that behavioral phe-
nomena should not matter in the field. I list 
four reasons. (1) In a number of economic 
decisions, feedback is infrequent (such as in 
house purchases) or noisy (such as in financial 
investments) and, hence, most individuals are 
inexperienced. (2) Experience can exacerbate 
a bias if individuals are not Bayesian learn-
ers. Michael S. Haigh and List (2005) use a 
simple investment game and show that pro-
fessional investors display significantly more 
myopic loss aversion (see section 2.2) than 
students. A possible explanation is that the 
short-term incentives in the workplace teach 
these investors to frame problems  narrowly, 
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contrary to the prediction of the standard 
theory. (3) In principle, debiasing by expe-
rienced agents can be a substitute for direct 
experience. However, as Gabaix and Laibson 
(2006) show, experienced agents such as firms 
typically have little or no incentive to debias 
individuals. (4) Finally, not all nonstandard 
features should be mitigated by experience. 
Experience should not affect social prefer-
ences any more than it should affect prefer-
ences for the characteristics of cars.
A second argument is that, even if experi-
ence or debiasing do not eliminate the biases, 
the biases will not affect aggregate market 
outcomes. The argument is made forcefully 
in financial markets: given arbitrage, the 
rational investors set prices. However, as I 
discussed, the limits to arbitrage (DeLong 
et al. 1990) imply that individuals with non-
standard features will in general affect stock 
prices. In addition, in most settings, there is 
no plausible incentive to eliminate a bias and, 
hence, the effect of nonstandard behavior 
aggregates linearly. If a share of the popula-
tion procrastinates saving for retirement, the 
aggregate savings rate will reflect proportion-
ally the undersaving by this group. This is 
true unless a different institutional design is 
put in place, such as the SMarT plan (Thaler 
and Benartzi 2004). (Notice that this plan 
was designed by academics, not by firms—
though firms ultimately adopted it).
Finally, the papers on behavioral IO indi-
cate that the nonstandard features, instead of 
having no impact, can in fact have a dispro-
portionate impact on market outcomes. Young 
Han Lee and Malmendier (2007) provide an 
example regarding overbidding in eBay auc-
tions. They define a case of overbidding when 
the final auction price is higher than a posted 
price for the same good available on eBay 
itself. They focus on an item for which the 
posted price is stable and essentially always 
available, and hence should be an upper bound 
for the bids in a rational model. The authors 
show that 42 percent of auctions end at a price 
above the posted price, a conclusion robust to 
the inclusion of shipping costs, to differences 
in item quality and in seller reputation. The 
key aggregation point is that this behavior is 
generated by many fewer than 42 percent of 
overbidders. In fact, only 17 percent of bidders 
ever overbid. The auction design is such that 
the overbidders are disproportionately likely 
to determine the final price.
A natural question is what empirical 
research in Psychology and Economics will 
look like in the future. Methodologically, 
I expect future research to continue using 
mostly the methods encountered in this over-
view, field experiments (such as List 2003 
and Falk 2007), natural experiments (such 
as Madrian and Shea 2001 and DellaVigna 
and Kaplan 2007), and inference from menu 
choice (such as DellaVigna and Malmendier 
2006 and Sydnor 2006), in addition, of course, 
to the laboratory experiments. These method-
ologies will increasingly provide, in addition to 
reduced-form estimates, also structural esti-
mates of the parameters (such as in Laibson 
et al. 2006 and Conlin, O’Donoghue, and 
Vogelsang 2007). These estimates will allow 
us to address a number of open questions, 
such as whether models of (β, δ) preferences 
can explain choice in different decisions for 
fixed parameters β,  ˆ      β, and δ. This estimation 
would benefit from the availability of data 
sets with multiple decisions by the same indi-
vidual. While individuals are likely to differ 
in their preferences and beliefs, we expect 
the same individual to behave consistently 
if the existing models capture the behav-
ior accurately.36 New, more parsimonious 
models of the  phenomena  presented in this 
 survey will likely also emerge, as Fudenberg 
(2006) predicts.
36 In a laboratory experiment, Raymond Fisman, 
Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits (2007) use repeated 
decisions on giving to another subject to identify types of 
subjects with different social preferences. Their results 
suggest substantial heterogeneity in social preferences.
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As for the topics, future research is likely 
to reduce the imbalance across fields in 
economics and across topics in psychology. 
While the research in behavioral finance and 
consumption–savings has been very active, 
relatively few studies, instead, have tackled 
mortgage markets, development, and politi-
cal decisions, fields ripe for exploration. The 
applications to public policy are also likely 
to become more common, along the lines 
of the 2006 Automatic Savings and Pension 
Protection Act inspired by the research on 
default effects in 401(k) savings. I also expect 
a continued interest in the market interaction 
between standard and nonstandard agents, 
as in section 5. In addition, while Psychology 
and Economics has focused mostly so far on 
inexperienced agents, future research is likely 
to document also the judgmental biases, such 
as overconfidence, of experienced agents such 
as managers and politicians.
Future research is also likely to explore psy-
chological phenomena that have been largely 
neglected. For example, emotions, automatic 
processing, and implicit discrimination are 
likely to matter for economic decisions such 
as divorce, judicial sentencing, and policing.
To conclude, in the ten years since Rabin’s 
1998 Journal of Economic Literature sur-
vey, the field of Psychology and Economics 
has accomplished much in the mind of this 
writer. More parsimonious models and a 
boom of evidence from the field have con-
tributed to integrate the laboratory findings 
in Psychology and Economics more into 
mainstream economics. Still, much remains 
to be done. Our knowledge of behavioral 
deviations is partial, with disparities by field, 
limited use of certain methodologies, and 
few applications of important psychologi-
cal phenomena. Hopefully, ten years from 
now, we will be able to assess quantitatively 
which psychological factors matter in which 
decisions.
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